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Abstract
Ubiquitous computing (UbiComp) envisions a new computing environment, where
computing devices and related technology are widespread (i.e. everywhere) and
services are provided at anytime. The technology is embedded discreetly in the
environment to raise users’ awareness. UbiComp environments support the prolif-
eration of heterogeneous devices such as embedded computing devices, personal
digital assistants (PDAs), wearable computers, mobile phones, laptops, office
desktops (PCs), and hardware sensors. These devices may be interconnected by
common networks (e.g. wired, wireless), and may have different levels of capa-
bilities (i.e. computational power, storage, power consumption, etc). They are
seamlessly integrated and interoperated to provide smart services (i.e. adaptive
services). A UbiComp environment provides smart services to users based on the
users’ and/or system’s current contexts. It provides the services to users unob-
trusively and in turn the user’s interactions with the environment should be as
non-intrusive and as transparent as possible. Access to such smart services and
devices must be controlled by an effective access control system that adapts its
decisions based on the changes in the surrounding contextual information.
This thesis aims at designing an adaptive fine-grained access control solution
that seamlessly fits into UbiComp environments. The solution should be flexible
in supporting the use of different contextual information and efficient, in terms of
access delays, in controlling access to resources with divergent levels of sensitivity.
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The main contribution of this thesis is the proposal of the Context-Risk-
Aware Access Control (CRAAC) model. CRAAC achieves fine-grained access
control based upon the risk level in the underlying access environment and/or
the sensitivity level of the requested resource object. CRAAC makes new con-
tributions to the access control field, those include 1) introducing the concept of
level of assurance based access control, 2) providing a method to convert the con-
textual attributes values into the corresponding level of assurance, 3) Proposing
two methods to aggregate the set of level of assurance into one requester level of
assurance, 4) supporting four modes of working each suits a different application
context and/or access control requirements, 5) a comprehensive access control ar-
chitecture that supports the CRAAC four modes of working, and 6) an evaluation
of the CRAAC performance at runtime.
11
Declaration
No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been
submitted in support of an application for another degree
or qualification of this or any other university or other
institute of learning.
12
Copyright
i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this
thesis) owns any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The
University of Manchester the right to use such Copyright for any adminis-
trative, promotional, educational and/or teaching purposes.
ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only in
accordance with the regulations of the John Rylands University Library of
Manchester. Details of these regulations may be obtained from the Librar-
ian. This page must form part of any such copies made.
iii. The ownership of any patents, designs, trade marks and any and all other
intellectual property rights except for the Copyright (the “Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights”) and any reproductions of copyright works, for example graphs
and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may
not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intel-
lectual Property Rights and Reproductions cannot and must not be made
available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the
relevant Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions.
iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication
and exploitation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property
Rights and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available
13
from the Head of School of Computer Science (or the Vice-President).
14
Acknowledgements
First of all, I thank Allah (the lord) for all his blessings, I would not have com-
pleted my PhD without his guidance and success. I would like to thank Dr. Ning
Zhang for her dedication and support throughout my PhD. Her comments and
feedback were invaluable and I really appreciate that. I would like to thank the
Cairo University, Egypt, for its financial support. I also would like to thank my
friends Tarek, Al-Kateb, and Essam for their help and support. May be last but
definitely not least, I really want to thank my wife, Noha, for all the support
and kindness that I have been overwhelmed by. Taking care of our kids, Omar
and Jojo, has really made me concentrating on my studies and progressing faster.
In addition, her understanding of my work and the good technical advices were
invaluable.
15
Dedication
In the name of Allah
Thy Lord hath decreed, that ye worship none save Him, and (that ye show) kind-
ness to parents. If one of them or both of them attain old age with thee, say not
”Fie” unto them nor repulse them, but speak unto them a gracious word. (23)
And lower unto them the wing of submission through mercy, and say: My Lord!
Have mercy on them both as they did care for me when I was little.(24) [Al-Isra
Chapter, The Holly Quran]
To those who have been always beside me, supporting me, and encouraging me
for no personal benefits
To you mother and father
I love you, I really do . . .
Ali
16
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Project Context
1.1.1 Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp)
Ubiquitous computing is a new computing paradigm, where computing devices
and related technology are widespread (i.e. everywhere) and services are provided
at any-time. The technology is embedded discreetly in the environment to raise
users’ awareness. UbiComp environments support the proliferation of heteroge-
neous devices such as embedded computing devices, personal digital assistants
(PDAs), wearable computers, mobile phones, laptops, office desktops (PCs), and
hardware sensors. These devices may be interconnected by common networks
(e.g. wired, wireless, etc) [10] and may have different levels of capabilities (i.e.
computational power, storage, power consumption, etc). They are seamlessly in-
tegrated and interoperated to provide smart services (i.e. adaptive services). A
UbiComp environment provides smart services to users [11] based on the users’
and/or system’s current contexts. For example, in a smart home environment,
tasks such as controlling heating and lighting, going to a grocery store, scheduling
17
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home appliances, and cooking are automatically adjusted according to the im-
mediate context. Thus, a resident does not have to physically intervene or think
about these tasks [12]. For instance, a smart fridge may alert a resident if it is
running out of milk. It may even place an order for milk at a distant grocery, be-
cause the fridge ’knows’ that it is cheaper than the one nearby. Or, to cite a more
serious example, a body sensor that records a low blood pressure reading for a
cardiac patient should immediately call an ambulance. A UbiComp environment
provides these kind of services to users unobtrusively [11] and in turn the user’s
interactions with the environment should be as non-intrusive and as transparent
as possible [13].
Access to such smart services and devices, such as the fridge and the body sen-
sor, must be controlled by an effective access control system. Access control mod-
els have their limitations which hinder their adoption in UbiComp environments.
Access control models such as access control matrices [14], rules-based model [15],
role-based access control models (RBAC) [16], and Generalised Role-Based Access
Control [17] are designed for traditional computing environments. For example,
RBAC is a powerful tool for specifying and enforcing an organisational policy
in a way that seamlessly maps to an enterprise structure [18]. Moreover, RBAC
is considered as a policy natural authorisation approach particularly suited to
large-scale distributed environments [19]. However, the traditional access con-
trol models are static; they make access control decisions based on the user’s
immutable attributes (e.g. identities). They are unable to capture the user’s
or environment’s contextual information from the surroundings. Therefore, they
can not react to any value changes in the contextual attributes that may have
security significance. Such access control models do not suit a dynamic com-
puting environment like UbiComp, where the surrounding context may change
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frequently, thus affecting the set of permitted actions of an access requester. Ac-
cess control in such an environment should be made adaptive in response to those
dynamic changes of the users’ contextual information which may have security
implications. In other words, access control in UbiComp environments should be
context-aware.
1.1.2 Context-aware Access Control
A context is defined as “Any information that can be used to characterise the
situation of an entity” [20]. It could be related to a user (e.g. user’s access
location) or a system (e.g. network type) and could be static or dynamic. Static
contextual information does not change during the course of a session. Dynamic
contextual information changes its values from one session to another, and even
during the same session. A UbiComp application has to adapt its services upon
the surrounding context; this includes dynamic and static contextual attributes.
It should promptly react to the value changes of the contextual attributes. While
services in a UbiComp environment are context-aware, a security service that is
used to control access to those services should also be context-aware. It should
be able to make access control decisions in adaptation to the dynamic changes of
the relevant contextual information. For example, if a UbiComp application uses
a facial recognition system to authenticate users, it may also be necessary to have
an alternative authentication mechanism in place. The latter can be activated,
for example, should the lighting system in front of the sensor, that captures the
user’s facial data, fail. A context-aware access control model incorporates the
contextual information in controlling access to sensitive resources. It acquires
contextual information from the corresponding context providers then feeds it
to the authorisation decision engine that evaluates the contextual information
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against the corresponding access control policies (i.e. those written based on the
contextual attributes) to produce an access control decision. In a location-aware
access control service, for instance, a user’s location information is used to control
access to a UbiComp service. Any change of the location information may lead
to reassessment of the permissions set assigned to the user. Context-aware access
control is a powerful tool to enforce context-aware access control policies, thus
providing dynamic and smart access control decision-making [21]. In fact, the
ability to revise access control decisions for the same access requester, as the
surrounding contextual information changes, allows a more fine-grained security
service provision in UbiComp environments.
1.2 Research Motivations and Challenges
Enabling access control in UbiComp environments is challenging. For example,
consider a new children’s hospital that controls access to its resources (e.g. patient
records, modality devices, operation rooms, etc) based upon context. Alice and
Bob are doctors who run two different clinics in this hospital while subscribing
to two different contextual attribute sets. To specify the access rights of Alice
over a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scanner, the associated access control
policy should be aware of Alice’s set of contextual attributes, and same for Bob.
This means that this access control policy should be expressed in terms of the set
of contextual attributes recognised in this application domain. In this hospital
there are some children’s gift shops scattered throughout. Both hospital and
shops share the same Electronic Announcement Board (EAB). The shops use
the EAB to publish their offers, whereas the hospital uses it to broadcast any
service change and other patient’s announcements. The same resource object,
EAB, has two different sensitivity levels depending on which system is using it.
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The EAB is of a higher sensitivity in the hospital than that in the shop. This is
because, from the hospital perspective, it is related to a patient’s record that may
contain sensitive data; in the shops, however, it is not. The smart system that
runs both hospital and shops uses the same contextual information to control
access to services in the hospital and shops. However, the way in which the
contextual information is represented differs between the hospital and the shops.
For example, the hospital may require the location information as a department
name, whilst a shop may require it as a distance from the shop location, as there
may be multiple shops in the same department. In this case, to specify an access
control policy for the EAB, it not only needs to know the required contextual
information, but also how this information is represented (i.e. the representation
model).
The main challenges in this access control configuration are:
1. How to capture Alice’s and Bob’s respective dynamic contextual informa-
tion and feed it, seamlessly, into the authorisation decision engine at run-
time.
2. How to accommodate new contextual attributes without imposing consid-
erable modifications to the underlying access control service.
3. How to handle varying sensitivity requirements for a protected resource
object.
4. How to deal with contextual information that is expressed using a different
representation model.
5. How to minimise the effect of compromising the server-side policy store.
6. How to incorporate the contextual information trustworthiness in such an
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access control system. This, in deed, encompass the trustworthiness of the
context provider as well as the provided contextual information.
In the above scenario, one could imagine how complex the context-aware ac-
cess control policies of the resource objects (i.e. the MRI scanner and the EAB)
will be under this access control configuration, especially bearing in mind that
these policies may need to be uploaded into a device with limited-capabilities
as those commonly seen in UbiComp environments. Apart from the complexity,
access rights are tightly coupled to the contextual information and its represen-
tation model. In these policies, adding new contextual data or remove obsolete
one will result in considerable modifications to these access control policies.
1.3 Problem Statement
This project aims to design an adaptive fine-grained access control solution that
seamlessly fits into UbiComp environments. The solution should be flexible in
supporting the use of different contextual information and efficient, in terms of
access delays, in controlling access to resources with divergent levels of sensitivity.
We may be able to achieve this adaptive fine-grained access control by in-
troducing a generic attribute, user’s trust level or Level of Assurance (LoA). We
may use this generic attribute to capture and quantify the effect of the user’s
contextual information on the assurance level in identifying the user. We, then,
link this assurance level to the privileges granted to the user. LoA is dynamic,
since its value changes depending upon the current state of the user’s contextual
information, thus access control decisions based on LoA are dynamic as well.
The above mentioned solution assumes that the contextual information is
trusted and of a high quality. In particular, we assume that the contextual
information is complete, significant, correct, and up-to-date [22]. In addition, we
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 23
assume that the context provider is trustworthy and protected against known
attacks (e.g. tamper-proof).
1.4 Aim and Objectives
The aim of this research project is to research, design, implement, and evaluate
an access control solution to validate the research hypothesis. To this end, the
project objectives are to:
1. investigate the characteristics of UbiComp and specify the requirements for
designing an access control solution that will support those characteristics.
2. critically analyse the current access control models (i.e. both conventional
and those designed for UbiComp) and evaluate their suitability in line with
the identified UbiComp access control requirements. In addition, identify
an appropriate method of achieving access control in this dynamic environ-
ment;
3. design an access control solution that seamlessly accommodates any set of
contextual information and adaptively controls access to UbiComp services.
will satisfy the UbiComp access control requirements;
4. evaluate the designed solution and validate if the research hypothesis is
true. If it is not, to explore the reasons for this;
5. publish the research results; and
6. write the PhD thesis.
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1.5 Research Achievements and Publications
The following lists the achievements of the research presented in this thesis: -
1. The Context-Risk-Aware Access Control model (CRAAC)
CRAAC is an adaptive LoA-linked access control model. It controls access
to resources with varying levels of sensitivity based upon the state of an
access requester’s contextual information. It supports adaptive access con-
trol decisions, since an access control decision for the same access requester
on the same resource object may vary each time. The variation depends
on the level of assurance of the access requester, which is based upon the
access requester’s current contextual information.
• CRAAC supports fined-grained access control, since it, virtually, ac-
commodates any set of contextual attributes. This level of abstraction
is achieved by the use of a trust-related parameter (i.e. Requester’s
Level of Assurance (RLoA)). In addition, in controlling access to a re-
source object, CRAAC accommodates the resource object’s sensitivity
level, that may be dynamic as well, to provide a more fine-grained ac-
cess control.
• CRAAC is flexible; adding new contextual attributes or removing ob-
solete ones will not significantly affect the underlying access control
system.
• CRAAC supports four modes of working to accommodate different
access control requirements.
2. Methods for context to LoA conversion
• LoA-to-Weight Conversion (L2WC ). Converting the individual con-
textual attributes to the corresponding levels of assurance using Rank
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Order Centroids (ROCs).
• RLoA Aggregation. Aggregating the user’s multiple attributes’ LoA
values into an aggregated level of assurance. Two types of relation-
ships amongst contextual attributes are identified and used for the
aggregation (i.e. Weakest-Link and Elevating).
3. An access control architecture along with its components to support the
novel CRAAC services and the CRAAC four modes of working.
4. Evaluation
• Performance evaluation of the CRAAC model.
• Denial of service attack investigation.
The publications produced in this research are:
1. Ali Ahmed & Ning Zhang, “An Access Control Architecture for Context-
Risk-Aware Access Control: Architectural Design and Performance Evalu-
ation”, accepted to be appeared in SECURWARE 2010.
2. Ali Ahmed & Ning Zhang, “Towards the realisation of context-risk-aware
access control in pervasive computing”. Telecommunication Systems, De-
cember, 2009.
3. Ali Ahmed & Ning Zhang, “CRAAC: Context-Risk-Aware Access Control“,
Informal Workshop on Formal Approaches to Ubiquitous Systems, Imperial
College, 14-15 September 2009.
4. Ali Ahmed & Ning Zhang, “A Context-Risk-Aware Access Control model
for Ubiquitous environments“, IMCSIT’ 2008: International Multiconfer-
ence on Computer Science and Information Technology., October, Pages
775-782, 2008.
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1.6 Thesis Structure
This thesis investigates the contextual attributes that may influence the assurance
level of an access requester in UbiComp environments. It defines those attributes
and suggests the corresponding LoA values. It also proposes two methods that
may be used to aggregate the contextual attributes LoA values into one access
requester’s LoA value. The use of an aggregation method depends on the rela-
tionship among the contextual attributes used. It then proposes an access control
model, namely Context-Risk-Aware Access Control (CRAAC) for UbiComp envi-
ronments. CRAAC has four modes of working each of which supports a different
access control configuration/requirement. The thesis also proposes an architec-
ture that realises the CRAAC vision and supports the CRAAC four modes of
working. A prototype of the CRAAC system has been developed and the perfor-
mance of the model has been investigated using the prototype. The security of
the system has been also analysed in terms of safety and denial of service attack.
In detail, Chapter 2 surveys the traditional access control models. Chapter
3 discusses and evaluates the access control models proposed for UbiComp envi-
ronments. It also identifies the shortcomings of those models and suggests the
best way forward. Chapter 4 presents the CRAAC model. It discusses the basic
model building blocks such as the contextual attributes identification, level of
assurance derivation, methods to derive an aggregate access requester’s level of
assurance, and CRAAC four modes of working. Chapter 6 proposes the CRAAC
architecture, along with its components, that realises the CRAAC services. It de-
scribes the architectural components in detail. It also shows how the RLoA-only
working mode uses the architecture. Then, it evaluates the RLoA-only mode
performance and security. Chapter 7 shows how the AttributeLoA-only mode
works and which architectural components will be used. It discusses the mode
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potentials and concerns compared against the RLoA-only mode. It then investi-
gates the performance of the AttributeLoA-only mode. Chapter 8 concludes the
thesis and suggests directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Traditional Access Control
Models
2.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter surveys some access control models that are proposed for tradi-
tional computing environments. It discusses two groups of these legacy models,
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). As
an example of the DAC model, the chapter presents the Access Control Matrix
(ACM). It also briefly highlights various implementations of the ACM model
such as the Access Control Lists (ACL), capabilities and authorisation relations.
This chapter mainly focuses on discussion about the Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) model. RBAC is the basis of a new generation of access control solutions
proposed for UbiComp environments. These solutions will be covered in Chap-
ter 3, which critically analyses those solutions and evaluates their suitability. In
conducting the survey, the good design principles of the models are examined for
possible inclusion in our proposed model.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows:
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• Section 2.3 discusses the DAC model using the ACM with its different
implementations (i.e. ACL, capabilities, and authorisation relations).
• Section 2.4 introduces the MAC model.
• Section 2.5 describes the RBAC core model, role hierarchy, constraints, and
model restrictions.
• Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the chapter.
2.2 Basic concepts
In this section, the basic concepts and terms used in access control in computer
systems are introduced. The term access control is used to restrict the actions
a legitimate entity can perform on a given resource object [23]. It enables an
authority to control access to a certain resource object by defining an associated
policy (i.e. access control policy). The policy contains all permissible actions
that an entity can initiate on the given resource object. A typical access control
system consists of a subject, an object, a permission, and credentials. A subject
is an entity that seeks access to a resource object and is sometimes referred
to as an access requester. This may be a human user, a software application
or a hardware device. An object is actually a target protected by the access
control system. A permission is an access right for a subject over an object. It
corresponds to a privilege that a subject owns over a certain object. A subject uses
some credentials to gain access over a particular object. A credential is defined
as “a piece of information that is used to prove the identity of a subject” [24];
passwords, crypto keys, and biometric data are examples of such credentials.
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2.3 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary access control (DAC) is a class of access control models that con-
trols access to an object based on the identity of a subject [25]. The identity
could be the subject’s user name or the subject’s group membership. The word
“discretionary” means that a subject that owns a certain access right over an
object can pass the access right to other subjects on his/her discretion. In other
words, DAC allows an owner of a particular access right to a specific object to
pass on the access right to other subject(s) based on the owner’s personal prefer-
ences. This capability makes the DAC model flexible in supporting commercial
solutions where no strict information flow is required. For example, manipulating
a shared folder on a server can benefit from this capability in DAC. The owner
(e.g. Bob) of an access right (i.e. read) over the shared folder can easily pass on
this access right to another subject (e.g. Eve) by creating a user-name/password
pair associated with Eve. In fact, no real control on the flow of information is
provided in DAC. Since Bob can pass his read right on to any body at his dis-
cretion, the system manager, for instance, is unable to control this. Thus, the
manager can not ensure the flow of information in the underlying system. This
property in DAC (i.e. lack of information flow control), actually, increases the
possibility of unauthorised access [23]. Therefore, DAC is not suitable for military
applications that require a rigorous control of information flow.
ACM is, perhaps, one of the first discretionary access control models for com-
puter systems. It defines the access rights of each subject over a set of resource
objects managed by the system [23]. In this model, a matrix is constructed in
which there is a column for every resource object and a row for each subject.
Therefore, a cell in this matrix specifies the access rights of a certain subject over
a particular object. For example, Table 2.1 shows a typical ACM for a system
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that manages a printer, a photocopier, and a seminar room. The subjects of this
system are Alice, Bob, and Eve. The table shows, for example, that the access
rights of Bob over the photocopier are ’copy’ and ’scan’, whereas Eve can only
use it as a ’fax’. There are various implementations of the ACM. The well-known
ones are ACL, capabilities, and authorisation relations.
Table 2.1: Access Control Matrix Sample
Subject Printer Photocopier Seminar Room
copy order equipment
scan access
Alice print
fax change PIN
copy
Bob order parts
scan
access
Eve print fax access
2.3.1 Access Control Lists
ACL [26] is, perhaps, the most popular implementation of the ACM. ACL can
be represented as storing the ACM in a columnar way. In other words, each
resource object will have an associated list that defines, for each subject, the set of
legitimate actions the subject can perform on it. A sample ACL is shown in Figure
2.1 that describes which subject can perform what action(s) on the photocopier.
The ACL implementation is object-centric, since it specifies an object’s legitimate
access modes. Thus, it is straightforward to update an object’s access modes by
modifying the associated ACL [23]. It is also easy to revoke an object’s access
modes by replacing the existing ACL with an empty one. However, determining
the access rights of a subject is not easy. It requires every ACL in the system to
be checked against the subject.
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Photo
Copier
Alice
Copy
Scan
Fax
Bob Eve
Copy
Scan
Fax
Figure 2.1: The Access Control List for a photocopier Machine
2.3.2 Capabilities
Capabilities are another implementation of the ACM. Unlike the ACL approach,
capabilities store the ACM in rows. In other words, each subject in the system will
have an associated capability over a set of managed resource objects. Capabilities
are subject-centric as depicted in Figure 2.2. This actually solves the problem of
determining the set of allowed actions by a specific subject by just examining
the subject’s associated capabilities. However, revoking an object’s access modes
requires all the capabilities in the system to be examined.
Alice Printer
print
Copier Seminar 
Room
copy
scan
fax
order
equipment 
access
change PIN
Figure 2.2: Alice’s Capability
2.3.3 Authorisation relations
An authorisation relation is another implementation of the ACM that is inspired
from the relational databases. As shown in Table 2.2, a relational table is created
where each row represents an access operation a subject can perform over a
specific object. This implementation does not actually favour one preview over
another, as ACL and capabilities do. It is easy to get a specific subject’s access
rights by sorting the table by subject, which actually corresponds to the capability
method. Similarly, sorting this authorisation table by object produces the same
effect as the ACL method.
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Table 2.2: Authorisation Relations
Subject Access Right Object
Alice print Printer
Alice copy Copier
Alice scan Copier
Alice fax Copier
Alice order equipment Seminar Room
Alice access Seminar Room
Alice change PIN Seminar Room
Bob order parts Printer
Bob copy Copier
Bob scan Copier
Bob access Seminar Room
Eve print Printer
Bob fax Copier
Bob access Seminar Room
2.3.4 DAC Summary remarks
It is worth noting that managing the ACM in a large-scale distributed environ-
ment is troublesome. ACM is a static access control solution. In this model,
subjects and objects need to be pre-defined. In addition, the access control deci-
sions are immutable. Additional constraints can not be imposed easily. Therefore,
DAC is not suitable for the UbiComp environments that require access control
to be adaptive to some dynamic constraints (i.e. contextual information). More-
over, DAC can not cope with information leakage caused by the weak control
of information flow. MAC was, in fact, proposed to overcome this weakness in
DAC.
2.4 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Unlike DAC where access rights are defined by the resource owner based on the
resource owner’s discretion, mandatory access control enables the access rights to
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be determined by a manager or a central authority of the system. In MAC, each
resource object in the system is labelled with a sensitivity level and each subject is
assigned a clearance level. This process is performed by a central authority not by
the resource owner. Access to a resource object is restricted to those subjects who
possess a valid clearance level (i.e. authorisation) [25]. MAC defines a meticulous
flow of information dissemination; thus the likelihood of potential illegitimate
access is reduced compared to the DAC model. The idea of labelling an object
with a sensitivity level, which a subject has to satisfy in order to gain access
to this object, is interesting. This is one of the principles used in our research
that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. It is worth emphasising that MAC
suits access control requirements where an object’s access right is determined by
a central authority and not at the discretion of the owner of the resource object.
Thus, it is suitable for governmental and military applications. However, MAC
is too rigorous for, for instance, commercial domains. A more flexible model that
can suit such domains is needed. The model was proposed as role-based access
control.
Unlike DAC, MAC model is vulnerable to the convert channel attack. Lamp-
son [27] defined the convert channel as ”(channels) not intended for information
transfer at all, such as the service program’s effect on system load”. The idea of
the attack is centred on adding capabilities to transfer information between enti-
ties, which are not supposed to do so. In other words, it is a kind of a collusion
between the sender and the receiver in a clear violation of the MAC security pol-
icy [28]. Any MAC model should pay attention to such a vulnerability, although
it is hard to detect.
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2.5 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
RBAC is an access control model that governs access to a resource object based
on a subject’s organisational role. A role represents certain activities a member of
staff (i.e. subject) can perform as a part of his/her organisational responsibilities.
Instead of assigning access rights to subjects directly, RBAC assigns access rights
to roles and then maps the roles to subjects. This facilitates scalable and efficient
management of an individual subject’s access rights, since no access rights are
accorded to subjects directly. This is, in fact, true if the number of roles managed
by an organisation is less than the number of subjects. Adding a new subject
or changing the responsibilities of an existing one would be a simple task, which
only requires the addition or modification of the subject-role mappings. In other
words, the access control administration becomes simple as a result of using
roles [16].
In RBAC, constraints can be imposed on the access requests to prevent unau-
thorised access or malicious activities. RBAC supports the “least privilege” se-
curity principle, in which a subject is given the least privilege which sufficiently
allows the subject to perform the task in hand (i.e. current role) [23]. In this way,
RBAC prevents the leakage of access rights to unauthorised entities and reduces
the risk of fraud. This also ensures integrity ; nobody is allowed to modify a data
item without a permission. The NIST standard [16] describes a family of services
or components an RBAC system should provide. These components include Core
RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, and Constrained RBAC. Since the research carried
out in this thesis is based on the RBAC model, an overview of these compo-
nents will follow. The overview focuses on the aspects of RBAC that could be of
interest in our problem domain (i.e. context-aware access control for UbiComp
environments).
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2.5.1 Core RBAC
The Core RBAC is the fundamental component in any RBAC-based system. It
includes the minimum set of functions that are needed to realise the RBAC model.
Two essential functions are introduced by the Core RBAC: User Assignment (UA)
and Permission Assignment (PA). UA defines a set of roles to which a user can
be mapped. For example, a user (e.g. Bob) could be assigned to the role set of
{Lecturer, Student Mentor, Admission Deputy}. In fact, UA determines the super
set of roles to which a user can be mapped as a part of the user’s organisational
duties. As seen in the example, the user-role relationship is many-to-many. A
user may be holding more than one role and a role may be held by more than one
user. PA, on the other hand, specifies the set of allowed actions for a given role.
It corresponds to assigning access rights to roles. For instance, the Lecturer role
could claim the following access right set {access seminar room, use projector,
use white board, etc}. The role-permissions relationship is many-to-many in the
same sense as in UA.
User sessions are an important element in the Core RBAC. A user’s session
specifies a time window that allows a role to be activated and deactivated for
this particular user. In other words, a user’s session contains the active roles of
the user. The set of allowed actions a user can perform is determined by the
active roles of the user, as the access rights are actually released at run-time to
those active roles. In other words, the combination of all the permissions assigned
to the active roles of a user constitutes the user’s access right set in a session.
The relationships between user, roles, permissions, and sessions are depicted in
Figure 2.3. The relationship between users and sessions is one-to-many. A user
may have many sessions, but a session is dedicated to exactly one user. More
advanced RBAC-based systems can be built on top of the Core RBAC. They
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Figure 2.3: The Core RBAC
extend the Core RBAC to support, for example, role hierarchy or constrained
access control.
2.5.2 Role Hierarchy
Many organisations naturally structure their roles hierarchically to benefit from
inheritance among roles. In fact, the role hierarchy facilitates the administration
of organisational roles. This is a well-known generalisation-specialisation pattern.
For example, a specialised electrical engineer may also inherit the access rights
of a more general role (e.g. engineer). RBAC utilises a model component (i.e.
Hierarchical RBAC) to deal with the role hierarchy. Figure 2.4 shows an RBAC
system with role hierarchy. Generally, multiple inheritance is allowed in hierar-
chies unless restricted. That is, a role may be composed of several other roles. A
role that inherits from multiple roles claims all access rights of the inherited roles
plus its own access rights.
An example of multiple role inheritance is given in Figure 2.5. An “Engineer
Manager” role may inherit the access rights of both “Engineer” and “Manager”
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Figure 2.4: The Hierarchical RBAC
roles. The Hierarchical RBAC, which supports access rights inheritance, pro-
vides flexibility in roles and access control management. It is possible to apply
additional constraints to restrict such role inheritance. For example, some roles
are mutually disjoint. A clerk at a bank counter, who can release funds, can
not be the one who verifies a client’s signature. An organisational role hierarchy
must not allow such roles to inherit from one another. In fact, there is another
model component, called Constrained RBAC, that is especially proposed for this
purpose.
E
m
p
lo
y
e
e
Technician
Engineer
Manager
Engineer
Manager
Technician
Manager
Figure 2.5: Example of a Role Hierarchy
2.5.3 Constrained RBAC
Constraints are necessary to ensure that no subject is given sufficient privileges
to misuse the system [23]. In other words, constraints are imperative in order to
support the “least privilege” principle. The Separation of Duties constraint (SoD)
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is the common constraint used in Constrained RBAC. The purpose of SoD, as
stated by Gligor et al. [29], is “to ensure that failures of omission or commission
within an organisation are caused only by collusion among individuals and, there-
fore, are riskier and less likely, and that the chances of collusion are minimised
by assigning individuals with different skills or divergent interests to separate
tasks”. Put simply, in any organisation, an entity which authorises an activity
can not be the same entity that carries out the activity. The Constrained RBAC
described in [16] recognises two types of SoD: Static SoD (SSD) and Dynamic SoD
(DSD). Gligor et al. [29] has defined four other types of SoD policies and linked
these types to the RBAC model. Figure 2.6 shows how constraints are used in
RBAC. As depicted in the figure, constraints can be used to restrict user-role and
role-permission assignments, role hierarchy, and user-sessions.
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Figure 2.6: RBAC with Constraints
2.5.3.1 Static Separation of Duty
SSD solves the conflict of interest problem. A particular role holder (i.e. subject)
must not gain the access rights of a mutual disjoint role holder. SSD actually
enforces certain requirements on the UA function. In other words, SSD places
constraints on the role membership. Thus, a user has to satisfy certain require-
ments before being assigned to a specific role. That is, if a user is granted a
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specific role, the user can not be assigned another role that is mutually disjoint
with the first role. As a consequence, the number of available permissions a user
can have is restricted or reduced. Thus, SSD controls, indirectly, the user’s per-
mission space [16]. It draws the boundaries around the permissible set of actions
a user can do as a part of the user’s organisational duties.
2.5.3.2 Dynamic Separation of Duty
Like SSD, DSD tries to restrict the permissions a user can have. Nevertheless,
DSD imposes certain constraints on the available permissions in the user’s per-
mission space. It is worth emphasising that the permissions associated with a
certain role are not released to a user unless the user has activated that role.
And this is when DSD is applied. In other words, DSD imposes constraints on
the role activation process. This supports the “least privilege” security principle,
discussed earlier, in a way that a user may have different security levels depending
on the task in hand and permissions are not granted unless a role is activated.
This kind of constraint is applied at access-time, i.e. when a user activates a role.
A good example to show the difference between SSD and DSD is given in [30]: “A
static policy could require that no individual who can serve as payment initiator
could also serve as payment authorizer. This could be implemented by ensuring
that no one who can perform the initiator role could also perform the authorizer
role. Such a policy may be too rigid for commercial use, making the cost of se-
curity greater than the loss that might be expected without the security. More
flexibility could be allowed by a dynamic policy that allows the same individual
to take on both initiator and authorizer roles, with the exception that no one
could authorize payments that he or she had initiated”.
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2.5.4 Advantages of RBAC over DAC/MAC
Rather than associating access rights to individual objects as in, for instance,
ACM, RBAC assigns access rights to certain roles. This maps naturally to an or-
ganisational structure. RBAC is considered a more generalised form of both DAC
and MAC. DAC and MAC could be seen as special cases of RBAC [31] or, in other
words, examples of policy configurations inside RBAC. RBAC is a powerful model
to specify and enforce organisational policies in a way that seamlessly maps to an
enterprise structure [18]. RBAC is considered as a policy natural authorisation
approach particularly suited to large-scale distributed environments [32].
2.5.5 What is Missing in RBAC?
Despite of a number of advantages, RBAC still has some limitations. Three of
these limitations have been identified by Sejong Oh [33]:
1. Roles inheritance in RBAC does not fully reflect the same process in real
organisations. For example, if a role R1 (i.e. a higher role) inherits from
another role R2 (i.e. a lower role) this means that R1 inherits the full
permissions set of R2, whereas in real life organisations, a higher role only
inherits a partial permission set of a lower role.
2. No clear separation between the “task” and “role” concepts. In real organ-
isations, sometimes a task may require the involvement of multiple roles.
In addition, in emergent computing environments such as UbiComp and GRID,
access control decisions are dynamic, as the privileges and capabilities of users
may change. For example, access rights in a UbiComp environment may not
depend solely on the users’ identities [34]. They may also depend on the context
in which an access request is made. This includes the user’s context such as the
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access location and access time, and the system’s context such as the system
load and network state. The RBAC model, in fact, is not able to consider the
contextual information in access control decision-making. It can not capture the
contextual information from an access requester’s surrounding environment nor
can it adapt its access control decision in response to any change of the contextual
information. The fact that access control policies in RBAC are presumably static
(i.e. they follow the same access control requirements regardless of any change
in the surrounding environment) hinders the application of RBAC to achieve a
more fine-grained access control required in UbiComp environments. There is a
need for a new access control model that can overcome the limitations mentioned
above. In other words, a model that is neither subject-centric nor assumes the use
of static policies like RBAC. Therefore, a new generation of access control models
has been proposed under the name of context-aware access control models. This
generation of access control models encompasses many access control solutions
that share the same concept of using contextual information in controlling access
to resource objects.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of the basic concepts of access control as
well as some of the well-known traditional access control models such as DAC,
MAC, and RBAC. DAC is not suitable for UbiComp environments, since it is
a static model that lacks a proper control of information flow. An owner of a
particular access right can pass the access right on to any other subject without
restrictions (i.e. at the owner’s discretion). However, DAC is suitable for com-
mercial applications, where such a limitation may be tolerated. MAC provides
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a rigorous control of information flow that is required in military and govern-
mental applications. Access control policies in DAC and MAC are immutable.
Access control decision-making follows static access control requirements that do
not exist in UbiComp. UbiComp requires a dynamic and flexible access control
solution that adaptively adjusts access control decisions based on the surrounding
environment (i.e. context). The RBAC model was introduced to overcome the
current limitations of DAC and MAC. RBAC is a flexible model that is a more
generalised form of DAC and MAC. RBAC-based solutions range from simple
to more sophisticated access control systems. This, in fact, depends on which
RBAC model components are used (e.g. Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, etc).
Although RBAC has advanced the research in the area of access control, it cannot
cope with the fundamental UbiComp requirement of accommodating contextual
information in access control decision-making. RBAC is the basis of a new gener-
ation of access control models. Those models extend RBAC to accommodate the
contextual information in access control decision-making. The following chapter
describes some of the most well-known context-aware access control models.
Chapter 3
UbiComp Access Control: A
Survey
3.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter discusses some of the existing access models that have been pro-
posed for UbiComp environments. This family of access control models is largely
context-aware. Thus, they are collectively called the Context-Aware Access Con-
trol (CAAC) model. CAAC, typically, extends the traditional RBAC model, dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, to accommodate the contextual information in controlling
access to sensitive resource objects. This chapter highlights some recent streams
in access control in UbiComp environments. In surveying those solutions, the
discussion mainly focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the architectural
components of the proposed access control models. The good design principles,
in those models, are emphasised to be used in our proposed model. Finally, this
chapter outlines the best way, from the author’s point of view, to advance the
research in access control for UbiComp environments, in order to overcome the
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identified weaknesses of the existing access control models for UbiComp environ-
ments.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: -
• Section 3.2 introduces the CAAC family and highlights some CAAC-based
proposals.
• Section 3.3 discusses some related efforts in advancing access control in
UbiComp environments.
• It also introduces the effort to consider a user’s trust in access control
decision-making.
• Section 3.4 critically analyses the CAAC-based models.
• It describes the approach that the CAAC model uses to accommodate the
contextual information in access control decision-making.
• Section 3.5 introduces our proposal to advance the research in access control
for UbiComp environments.
• Finally, Section 3.6 summarises the chapter.
3.2 Context-Aware Access Control (CAAC)Mod-
els
The CAAC model denotes a family of access control proposals that control access
to resources by using the user’s contextual information. A CAAC-based model
uses the contextual information as additional 1 constraints to govern access to
sensitive resources. It is worth emphasising that most CAAC-based solutions are
1Additional to the SoD constraints discussed earlier in chapter 2
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built on the RBAC model discussed earlier in Chapter 2. As shown in Figure
3.1, the CAAC model introduces a new type of constraints, called contextual
constraints, to govern the UA and PA functions. A user is granted a certain role
iff the user satisfies a particular contextual constraint (i.e. specified in the UA
policy). Similarly, a permission is released to a given role, provided that the role
holder satisfies a certain contextual constraint (i.e. specified in the PA policy).
Many access control proposals are CAAC-based. A detailed discussion of some
of those proposals will be given in the following subsections.
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Figure 3.1: CAAC Conceptual View
3.2.1 Generalised Role-Based Access Control
The Generalised Role-Based Access Control (GRBAC) is, perhaps, the earliest
CAAC-based proposal. It was proposed by Covington et al in [35]. The proposal
was motivated by and designed for smart home environments. GRBAC extends
the concept of role to encompass two new types of roles: environment role and
object role. An environment role captures an environment state, which represents
a system’s contextual information that should be incorporated into access control
decision-making. On the other hand, an object role is used to capture an object’s
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sensitivity level. For example, an object may have, depending on the situation,
a confidential role or top classified role. Thus, for a subject (Sub) to perform a
certain task (T ) over an object (Obj ) in an environment (Env), it requires the
following: -
1. Determining the object role RoleObj .
2. Determining the subject role(s) RoleSub (i.e. the traditional RBAC role).
3. Determining the environment role(s) RoleEnv.
4. Checking if T is allowed for RoleSub on RoleObj when RoleEnv is active.
Using the extended roles(i.e. object role and environment role) removes the
subject-centric limitation of the RBAC model. An access control policy could
now be written from an object’s perspective, environment perspective, or any
possible combination of both [35]. However, the access control decision-making
in GRBAC is more complex than that of RBAC. It requires the use of a more
complex system architecture than the traditional RBAC model. This is due to
the introduction of the new extended roles [35, 36].
3.2.2 Spatio-Temporal Models
Many access control solutions proposed in literature use the location and time
contextual information to control access in UbiComp environments. Examples
include the Temporal RBAC (TRBAC) model [37], the Generalized Temporal
RBAC (GTRBAC) [38], and the Spatial RBAC (SRBAC) [39]. In these solutions,
roles/permissions are granted to a user in specific time intervals and/or if the user
is within a particular location.
The TRBAC model extends the traditional RBAC model by introducing a
temporal constraint into the access control policy specification. The inclusion of
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the temporal constraint provides a mechanism to enforce time-dependent access
control policies [2]. Thus, a role is enabled or disabled iff a certain temporal con-
straint is satisfied. The GTRBAC model further extends the TRBAC model by
introducing the notion of an activated role. In other words, GTRBAC differen-
tiates between role enabling and role activation. An enabled role indicates the
possibility of a subject to claim it along with its permission set; however this is
not done yet. An active role, on the other hand, is an enabled role that has been
activated by at least one subject in a session. This means that a subject has
acquired the permission set of that role. The notion of the active role helps to
determine the currently running roles. This can be used to monitor the resource
usage and activities taken place. GTRBAC imposes several temporal constraints
on the role activation, enabling times, and UA/PA policy specification [38].
The SRBAC introduces a location-dependent constraint. It restricts the set
of permissible actions a subject can perform based on the subject’s location infor-
mation. The location space is divided into multiple zones. An access permission
is granted if the role condition is satisfied and the subject is within a specific
zone. Table 3.1 shows an example of how permissions are assigned to roles based
on the location information. It depicts a permissions list associated with a cus-
tomer role. For example, a customer role holder in zone1 has a permission set of
{p1, p2, p3}, whereas in zone2, the permission set is {p4}. The SRBAC model,
as observed by Zhang et al [40], suffers from a lack of a semantic meaning of the
position information. It also does not support the use of geometrically bounded
roles.
Table 3.1: Location Permission Assignment List in SRBAC
Roles Location Permissions
customer role Zone1 p1, p2, p3
customer role Zone2 p4
customer role Zone3 ∅
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There are a number of other proposals that fall into this spatio-temporal
access control approach including those described in [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 40, 47,
48, 49, 50]. Those proposals support either location-aware, time-aware, or both
of them.
3.2.3 Dynamic Role-Based Access Control
A common feature in the proposals discussed above is that they take the con-
textual information into account at the beginning of an access session. In other
words, contextual information is evaluated when an access control request is re-
ceived. Thus, when an access control decision is made, no further evaluation for
contextual information is performed. They make no effort in adjusting the access
control decision during the course of an access session. In addition, models such
as spatio-temporal are restricted to only time and location information. Contex-
tual information is not just location and time. A fine-grained access control in
UbiComp environments should incorporate every relevant contextual information
that has significance on access control.
To bridge this gap, the Dynamic Role-Based Access Control (DRBAC) model
was proposed [51]. DRBAC dynamically adjusts the permission assignment as
well as the role assignment based on a subject’s contextual information. The
contextual information could be any piece of information not just time or location.
It uses a Central Authority (CA) to manage the role hierarchy and to grant roles
to users. To perform this task, the CA dispatches an agent to a user’s device for
every role the user has been assigned to. The agent monitors the user’s context.
It changes the active role dynamically based on the changes in the contextual
information. It uses a state machine to express the user’s roles. Typically, the
user is assigned an initial role and any change in the contextual information will
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be detected by the agent, which will, in turn, trigger an event. The event will
result in a transition between the current state (i.e. current role) to the next state
(i.e. new role) in the state machine. In this way, the DRBAC model changes the
user’s role dynamically in response to the user’s contextual information changes,
thus achieving adaptive context-aware access control.
DRBAC suffers from a number of drawbacks, some of which have been high-
lighted by the authors themselves. For example, implementing the model can
increase the complexity of the applications concerned. Each role requires a role
state machine running on the user’s device. As the number of roles supported in
the system increases, the complexity of the system is also increased. This is par-
ticularly troublesome for the resource-restricted devices that are commonly used
in UbiComp environments. In addition, as mentioned in [42], the paper has not
illustrated how the DRBAC model may be applied practically in an application.
In spite of these drawbacks, DRBAC is considered one of the most pioneering
access control solutions for UbiComp environments.
3.2.4 CAAC-basedModels with Architectural Components
To support the CAAC approach, there is a need for an architecture that could
feed contextual information into access control decision-making. In other words,
a CAAC architecture should encompass two main functional blocks (i.e. infras-
tructures). One block would be for the contextual information management,
and the other block would be for access control. However, the traditional access
control architectures only accommodate access control, thus not appropriate for
supporting context-aware access control. To overcome this limitation, there have
been increased efforts to design architectures that support context-aware access
control. The following gives a brief survey of some of those efforts.
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3.2.4.1 UbiCOSM
UbiCOSM [5] is another CAAC-based model that evaluates the current context
state of a mobile user in real-time. It uses the context state to control access to
protected resources. As seen in Figure 3.2, UbiCOSM is a modular middle-ware.
It uses external architectural modules such as CARMEN [52] for low-level entity
identification and context management. However, the tight-coupling between
access permissions and contextual information in UbiCOSM makes it difficult
to accommodate different access control requirements, policies, and application
domains.
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Figure 3.2: UbiCOSM Middleware Services [5]
UbiCOSM separates the authorisation engine from the access control enforce-
ment by introducing the Authorisation Enforcement Manager. This provides
high level of modularity. Since the access control enforcement is application-
dependent, one can replace an existing enforcement point with another depending
on the application domain and requirements.
3.2.4.2 OpenAmbient
OpenAmbient [6] presents a web service-based architecture that preserves privacy
and protects resources in ambient environments. The architecture, as depicted in
Figure 3.3, uses the ContextToolkit [53] for contextual information gathering. The
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ContextToolkit acts as an ambient information provider that resides internally in
the OpenAmbient architecture. Similar to UbiCOSM, OpenAmbient has a high
degree of modularity, allowing the use of external modules (e.g. ContextToolkit).
The paper, however, only describes the basic OpenAmbient architecture and does
not explain how the architectural components interact and communicate with
each other to reach an access control decision. OpenAmbient also follows the
same UbiCOSM convention of separating the access control enforcement and the
authorisation engine. It supports the former by introducing the Enforcer, while
the Evaluator is meant for the latter function.
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Figure 3.3: OpenAmbient Architecture [6]
3.2.4.3 The Gaia Architecture
Gaia [7] is one of the earliest efforts to develop context-aware applications. Gaia
is regarded as a meta operating system, which provides an environment for the
development and execution of active spaces. The main contribution of Gaia is the
proposal of the first meta operating system that has context-awareness as a built-
in service. In other words, context-awareness was a fundamental requirement in
the design of the operating system, rather than as an add-on service to an existing
operating system. Moreover, Gaia shifts the task of context management from
the application layer to the operating system layer. Thus, when developing an
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active space application, one does not have to worry about the task of managing
contextual information. However, the Gaia architecture, as depicted in Figure 3.4,
does not address access control specifically. Therefore, Gaia does not propose
any building blocks for access control. The lack of a standard access control
infrastructure in Gaia makes it hard for different systems to cooperate seamlessly.
This is because a system may have its own terminologies and architectures.
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Figure 3.4: The Gaia Architecture [7]
To bridge this gap, the work in [54] is proposed. It describes an access control
system for the Gaia Active Spaces system. Its architecture shows a set of applica-
tions that run on behalf of users to access certain devices, where software services
act as interfaces for the applications to access devices. The access control service
consists of an Interceptor module and Access Control Policies. The Interceptor
intercepts all access requests, evaluates these requests, and only allows authorised
requests.
3.2.4.4 Context-Constrained Access Control (CoCoA)
The CoCoA model described in [8] is a context-constrained authorisation frame-
work designed for GRID environments. It is built on the GT4 authorisation
framework [55] by adding additional modules to support context-awareness. These
modules, as seen in Figure 3.5, are Context Authority, Context PIP, Context PDP,
Context Session Service, and Notification API. The Context Authority provides
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Figure 3.5: The CoCoA Architecture [8]
real-time, up-to-date contextual information. In addition, it may carry out fur-
ther operations to interpret some specific contextual information. The Context
PIP provides an assertion of a subject’s contextual information, supplied by the
Context Authority to the Context PDP, before the latter makes a context-aware
access control decision. The Notification API allows a GRID service provider to
be notified whenever a renew authorisation decision is available for reinforcement.
Upon the receipt of a context change notification, the service provider may termi-
nate the user’s access session. The CoCoA design has adopted a number of good
practices such as reducing the level of coupling among architectural components
and compliance to international standards (i.e. the GT4 authorisation frame-
work standard). However, owing to different motivations, CoCoA is not readily
applicable to the context that we are examining. CoCoA is designed for GRID
applications, thus one of the assumptions used in its design is that an access
session is typically for a job execution, which may last for hours or even days.
Therefore, the CoCoA model monitors a user’s contextual information during the
course of an access session. Should there be any change in the user’s context, it
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terminates the user’s access session. This is in stark contrast to the problem we
are addressing in this thesis. This thesis concerns data accesses in a UbiComp
environment where an access session is typically short (i.e. for one data item
access only). Furthermore, we would like to quantify the impact of contextual
information on the level of assurance associated with the data access. We would
then feed this level of assurance into the access control decision-making at the
beginning of an access session and monitor its change during the access session.
3.3 Recent Proposals
3.3.1 Generalised Context-Based Access Control
Filho and Martin in [9] have proposed a generalised context-based access control
model. In this model, access to resource objects is controlled solely based on con-
textual information. The model is designed for an open UbiComp environment
where no predefined roles or relationships among participants exist. This is in
stark contrast to our problem domain. Our domain assumes the existence of a
predefined relationship between participants(i.e. in the form of roles). The paper
also proposes a language (i.e. Context Condition Language) to express contextual
constraints. As depicted in Figure 3.6, it introduces an associated architecture,
along with its components, to support this vision of access control. The architec-
ture supports two services (i.e. infrastructures): the Context Information Service
(CIS) and the access control service. The CIS infrastructure provides functional
blocks for context management tasks, such as context collection, context rea-
soning, etc. Whereas the access control service is responsible for access control
decision-making.
The main contribution in this architecture that has not been found in the
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Figure 3.6: The Generalised Context-Based Access Control [9]
previous ones is: the QoC Evaluator. This component is responsible for evaluating
the quality of context provided by different contextual providers. This point, as
stated in Section 1.2, is crucial in context-aware access control. However, the
main concern in this architecture is that it only supports one Policy Decision
Point (PDP). This means that there is only a single point of decision-making.
Thus, incorporating an external PDP for, for instance, a location-aware access
control is not possible. In addition, while evaluating an access request, this single
PDP needs to be aware of all types of contextual information used. Such a design
principle may limit extensibility and flexibility.
3.3.2 Activity-Based Access Control
Another stream of access control is centred on the concept of activity. Many
activity-based access control proposals exist in the literature (e.g. [33, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60]). In fact, the activity-based computing is a new computing paradigm that
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is more suitable for UbiComp environments [56]. For example, Task-Activity
Based Access Control (TABAC) focuses on access control in an environment
where an activity is performed by multiple organisations [58]. In TABAC, a pro-
cess is composed by activities that are associated with tasks. Permissions are
dynamically assigned to tasks. A process can dynamically claim permissions as
a result of its activities interactions. In other words, permissions are assigned to
a task that could be linked to one or more activities. Those activities are the
building block of a particular process.
Activity-Oriented Access Control (AOAC) [60] is another example of activity-
based access control solutions. In AOAC, a user is allowed to carry out a certain
activity if the user holds a set of required permissions. AOAC uses a PEP and
a PDP. The PEP enforces access control decisions, while the PDP is a decision
point at which access control decisions are made. In addition, AOAC proposes
an Activity Recognition Manager that recognises users’ activities. However, the
paper is not clear about how activities are recognised. In fact, activity recognition
is one of the major challenges in designing such a solution.
3.3.3 Using Trust to Control Access to Resources
The idea of using trust in controlling access to sensitive resource objects has been
around in the literature for a while. However, most of the proposals, such as the
ÆTHER model [61] and the trust-based access control model [62], are designed for
an open dynamic UbiComp environment where no predefined relationships exist.
For example, the ÆTHER model is designed to address trust establishment and
access control management in UbiComp. It addresses the problem of trust by
allowing members of the attribute authority sets, defined by service providers,
to issue credentials for the corresponding attributes that can be used to access
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protected resources. Attribute authority sets membership is dynamic, thus pro-
viding a distributed administration of trust amongst different authority domains.
However, ÆTHER does not address how contextual information is collected and
fed into the authorisation engine.
Another relevant piece of work is proposed in [63]. The work is motivated by
the need for a new access control model that not only considers the contextual
information but also accommodates the effect of the contextual information on
the overall risk level of the underlying system. It uses some risk assessment tools
to govern access control decision-making. The risk assessment process conducted
in this model is online and covers confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. In
other words, whenever an access request is received, the system performs an online
risk assessment process to evaluate the potential risks related to confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication before an access control decision is made. However,
the work does not evaluate the performance of the model. As, in this model,
the risk assessment process is performed online (i.e. when an access request is
received) its impact on the access delay may not be negligible. In addition, it is
not clear in this work how a resource object with different sensitivity levels are
considered in the risk assessment process and how to fed this into access control
decision-making.
3.4 What is Still Missing?
The way in which CAAC uses the contextual information in access control is
troublesome. CAAC uses the contextual information as direct constraints that
govern UA and PA functionalities. Many problems exist in such a way of using
the contextual information. In summary, These problems are:
1. Limited set of contextual attributes: Proposals such as [37, 38, 39, 41, 42,
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43, 44, 45, 47] can only cater for a small number of contextual attributes
(i.e. spatio-temporal contextual attributes).
2. Limited generality, extensibility, and flexibility: A CAAC-based solution
could be seen as an Access Control Infrastructure (ACI) that communicates
with a Context Management Infrastructure (CMI). The ACI is responsi-
ble for authenticating users, making access control decisions and, finally,
enforcing the access control decisions. Whereas the CMI provides contex-
tual services such as context acquisition, storage, interpretation, protection
and provisioning. Since CAAC directly uses the contextual information to
control access to a protected resource object, CAAC is considered context-
dependent. That is, an access control policy in CAAC is expressed in terms
of the contextual information used. The corresponding authorisation engine
uses the policies to grant/deny access to a protected resource object. Thus,
changing the set of contextual information used will result in emphatic
change in the underlying authorisation engine. This actually indicates a
tight coupling between the two infrastructures (i.e. ACI and CMI) that
may reduce the generality, extensibility, and flexibility of the overall access
control service. For example, adding a new contextual information may
require the underlying access control system to be re-engineered [64].
3. Overlooking the potential correlation among contextual attributes: CAAC
overlooks the potential correlation among multiple contextual attributes
and their composite effect on the authorisation decision. For example, a
partial permission set may be released to a user who is accessing a certain
protected resource object from a high risk location, whereas a full permis-
sion set may be released if the user is accessing the resource object from a
secure location. However, the high risk location with the use of a strong
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authentication token (i.e. PKI credential) may be equal to the secure loca-
tion with the use of a less secure authentication token (i.e. user-name and
password pair). This example indicates that the access location contextual
attribute and the authentication token are correlated. Such a correlation is
not explicitly considered in CAAC.
4. Overlooking the context provider’s trust level. In other words, the level
of trust in the provided contextual information is not used in controlling
access to sensitive resource objects. This is, in fact, an important drawback
in CAAC, as the context provider is assumed to be trusted (i.e. part of the
Trusted Computing Base (TCB)).
3.5 The Best Way Forward
The level of impact, or potential risk, of an unauthorised access is closely related
to the sensitivity level of the requested resource object. The higher the object’s
sensitivity level, the higher the level of impact should the object be accessed by an
unauthorised entity. To provide an effective level of protection, while at the same
time not introducing unnecessary overheads, the applied security protection level
should be linked to the sensitivity level of the objects under protection. One way
to achieve this just-enough-security protection is to link an authorisation decision
to the Level of Assurance (LoA) in identifying the entity requesting access to an
object. In other words, the higher the requested object’s sensitivity level, the
higher the Requester’s LoA (RLoA) a user has to satisfy before granting access
to the resource object.
A user’s RLoA may also be influenced by the user’s contextual information
(i.e. both static and dynamic). In other words, we could design an access con-
trol solution that takes into consideration, not only a user’s static contextual
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attributes, but also the dynamic contextual attributes. The access control solu-
tion derives RLoA values, based on the static and dynamic contextual attributes,
then feeds the RLoA values into the authorisation engines for a proper control of
resources in UbiComp environments. In this way, we could adapt an access con-
trol decision in response to the resource object’s sensitivity level and the changes
in the user’s LoA-affecting contextual information, thus achieving fine-grained
access control.
Our proposal is summarised as follows: -
1. The resource objects are classified into groups based on their sensitivity lev-
els. This is done as an off-line process that could be repeated if necessary.
Thus, every resource object will have an Object’s LoA value (OLoA) that
denotes the required level of assurance a user has to satisfy before releas-
ing the resource object. It is worth emphasising that the OLoA value is
computed with respect to the object sensitivity level2.
2. On every access request of a particular user, the contextual information of
the user (i.e. both static and dynamic) is used to compute a LoA value in
the identity of the user (i.e. RLoA).
3. The authorisation engine will then compare OLoA against RLoA. IfRLoA ≥
OLoA, then access is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.
4. The user’s contextual information is monitored, and any change in such
information will be captured and the access control decision will need to be
re-assessed based on the new contextual information.
The use of LoA introduces a level of abstraction between the contextual in-
formation used and the underlying access control model. Thus, we could loosen
2See Subsection 4.4.2 for potential methods to achieve this
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the tight-coupling between the two infrastructures (i.e. ACI and CMI). This
could make the solution easily applicable in any UbiComp application domain.
Moreover, the solution allows to accommodate, virtually, any set of contextual
information without the need to modify the underlying access control system. We
believe this is the best way to advance access control in UbiComp environments.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has surveyed some of the access control models that are proposed
for UbiComp environments. In particular, it has critically analysed the CAAC-
based proposals, such as GRBAC, SRBAC, TRBAC, DRBAC, and CoCoA. The
most notable weakness in these proposals is the tight-coupling between ACI (i.e.
responsible for access control decision-making) and CMI (i.e. responsible for
contextual information management). As a result, changing the content of the
contextual attribute set requires a significant modification in the ACI. In addition,
some CAAC-based solutions only consider a limited set of contextual information
(e.g. location and time). The potential correlation among multiple contextual
attributes have also been overlooked. Recent access control proposals (e.g. the
generalised context-based access control model, activity-based models, and trust-
based models) have also been investigated. The gap between the issues addressed
in these proposals and what is addressed in this thesis has also been identified. For
example, some of these models are designed for an open UbiComp environment,
which assumes no prior relationships amongst the entities involved exist. Thus,
the focus is on how to establish trust under such an assumption. However, our
problem scope is how to achieve just-enough security in UbiComp, in adaptation
to a resource sensitivity level, while maximising flexibility and extensibility of the
solution. We have outlined our vision to design an access control solution that
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overcomes the existing solutions limitations.
There are some concerns regarding the proposed access control approach such
as how to determine the LoA-affecting contextual information, and how to com-
pute the RLoA value. These concerns will be covered in the following chapter.
Chapter 4
Context-Risk-Aware Access
Control (CRAAC)
4.1 Chapter Introduction
As explained in Chapter 3, CRAAC achieves LoA-linked access control. In other
words, based upon the risk level in the underlying access environment and/or
the sensitivity level of the resource object requested, CRAAC requires an access
requester to satisfy a minimum level of assurance. The level of assurance is
related to the requester’s contextual information. This chapter describes the
CRAAC vision in detail. It identifies the contextual attributes that may affect
a requester’s level of assurance. It analyses the mutual relationships among the
attributes and proposes methods to accommodate the relationships. Thus, at run-
time, CRAAC can use the methods to dynamically derive an aggregate level of
assurance (i.e. RLoA) for a given requester based upon the requester’s contextual
information. Then, it uses the RLoA to govern access control decision-making
for the requester.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: -
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• Section 4.2 introduces the CRAAC model and its vision in supporting LoA-
linked access control.
• Section 4.3 identifies four contextual attributes that may have direct impact
on a user’s RLoA and shows how the corresponding LoA may be computed.
• Section 4.4 explores the possible LoA-to-Weight conversion methods.
• Section 4.5 identifies two mutual relationships among multiple contextual
attributes and shows how to capture those relationships. In other words, it
introduces two situations where the RLoA aggregation may differ: Elevating
and Weakest-link.
• Section 4.6 outlines CRAAC four modes of working and the rationale behind
the design of those modes.
• Finally, Section 4.7 summarises the chapter.
4.2 CRAAC Vision
The level of impact/risk of an unauthorised access depends on the sensitivity
level of the requested resource object. The higher the object’s sensitivity level,
the higher the level of impact should the object be accessed by an unauthorised
entity. To provide an effective level of security, while at the same time not to
introduce unnecessary overheads, the applied security protection level should be
linked to the sensitivity level of the objects under protection. One way to achieve
this just-enough-security protection approach is to link an authorisation decision
to the LoA in identifying the entity requesting access to an object. In other
words, the higher the requested object’s sensitivity level, the higher LoA a user
has to satisfy when requesting the object. A user’s LoA (i.e. RLoA) is derived
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based on the user’s contextual information. Thus, any change in the contextual
information may also trigger a change in the RLoA of the user. The CRAAC
model is designed to realise this vision of LoA-linked access control.
CRAAC could be seen as a MAC solution where an object is labelled with
a required level of sensitivity and a subject is assigned a clearance level (i.e.
RLoA). Nevertheless, CRAAC differs in the way that it does not statically assign
an RLoA value to a subject (i.e. as MAC does). Rather, it computes the RLoA
value dynamically for each access request.
In CRAAC, resources/services are classified into object groups each with a dis-
tinctive OLoA value. The determination of the OLoA value of an object group is
based on the sensitivity level of the object group. This can be performed through
an off-line risk assessment process. The proposal described in [63] is an interesting
work and the same method could be used in CRAAC as well. In other words,
identifying the impact of releasing a resource object on the loss of availability,
confidentiality, and integrity. In general, the assessment identifies risks, evaluates
their potential impacts, and maps the identified risks to an appropriate assurance
level (i.e. OLoA). The OLoA of a resource object is actually the minimum LoA
requirement, requested by the object, a subject has to satisfy to gain access to the
resource object. The more sensitive the object is, and/or the higher the potential
impact of an unauthorised access, the higher the OLoA. In detail, CRAAC access
control decision-making process follows the following steps:
1. A resource provider, or a central authority, specifies an OLoA value for each
resource object under his/her management. The OLoA value specification
is determined based upon the object’s sensitivity level and is used as a
threshold to control access to the resource object.
2. When CRAAC receives an access request, it uses the surrounding contextual
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information to derive a subject’s RLoA value.
3. The RLoA value is then compared against the OLoA value of the required
object. The access request is granted 1 iff RLoA ≥ OLoA.
One of the challenging tasks for realising this vision of LoA-linked access
control is how to derive an RLoA value for a given access request based upon the
requester’s real-time contextual information. To achieve this, there is a need to:
1) identify a set of contextual attributes that may have an impact on the degree of
certainty (i.e. LoA) that the access request is from an entity that it claims to be
from, 2) investigate, analyse, and define the respective assurance levels for those
contextual attributes, and 3) devise a method that can derive the RLoA value
based upon the contextual attributes’ LoA values. The following gives details on
how to perform such tasks.
4.3 Contextual Attributes Identification and LoA
Determination
There is a number of factors that can increase the risk of unauthorised access,
e.g. weak authentication protocol/token, less trustworthy access location, poor
access history, unprotected communication channels, etc. As a proof of concept,
this thesis focuses on the following four contextual attributes:
• Electronic Authentication Token.
• Access Location.
• Channel Security.
1Provided that the access right is included in the subject’s role permission set (i.e. traditional
RBAC model)
CHAPTER 4. CONTEXT-RISK-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL (CRAAC) 68
• Access History.
4.3.1 Electronic Authentication Token
Many factors in an electronic authentication process may affect the assurance
level (i.e. LoA) in verifying a claimed identity. These include identity proofing,
credential management, record keeping, auditing, authentication protocols, and
token types. The assurance levels of some of these factors are achieved through
procedural and process governance, while others may be left to the requesters’
decision. For example, a requester may choose to use a particular authentication
credential when making an access request. As the focus here is on the derivation
of an authentication LoA and on linking it to the authorisation decision making,
the procedural factors (i.e. user registration, credential management, storage
procedures, etc) are excluded from the LoA derivation. In other words, we only
consider the effect of the types of electronic credentials/tokens, collectively called
eTokens, on RLoA. Different eTokens provide varying levels of assurance in entity
identification. To quantify that degree of confidence, we introduce the notion of
LoAeToken.
Definition 1 LoAeToken refers to the service provider’s degree of confidence (i.e.
assurance) that an eToken presented by a subject is linked to the subject’s identity.
The eToken types versus their assurance levels have been recommended by
NIST [1], as shown in Table 4.1. NIST recognises the token types of hard tokens,
soft tokens, one-time password (OTP) device tokens, and user-name/password
pairs. NIST defines four levels (i.e. from 1 to 4, with Level 4 the most secure
one) of LoAeToken that corresponds to these tokens.
The research conducted in this thesis adopts the NIST standard for LoAeToken.
In other words, at run-time, a subject may choose any of the four authentication
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Table 4.1: eToken Types Versus LoAeToken [1]
Token Type Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Hard Token X X X X
One-time Password Token X X X
Soft Token X X X
Password Token X X
methods (i.e. eTokens). The LoA associated with the eToken can be determined
by Table 4.1. Changing an authentication method token type during the course
of an access session may also change the corresponding LoA.
4.3.2 Access Location
Authentication services are of two main types; one is e-authentication by which a
user is identified through the use of an eToken, and the other is physical au-
thentication (p-authentication) by which a user is identified through the use
of biometrics, sensors, or location based services. CRAAC recognises both of
these authentication service types. This is because, firstly, a combined use of
e-authentication and location-based p-authentication may not only provide op-
tional services to users but also a more reliable user identification. Secondly,
the proliferation of the location-aware services in UbiComp requires the access
control service to accommodate the location information as well. Therefore, in
addition to the eToken attribute, we introduce another authentication attribute
called Access Location (ALoc). The assurance level of ALoc, LoAALoc, is defined
below.
Definition 2 LoAALoc refers to the degree of confidence/assurance in a subject’s
claimed access location.
Depending on the application context, there are various approaches to repre-
sent the location alternatives [65, 66]. As our focus is on the degree of confidence
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in a claimed location and as a proof of concept, we use the zone representation
method [65, 39] to describe different location alternatives. Table 4.2 shows some
possible location alternatives versus the corresponding assurance levels. The table
is meant to illustrate how the location LoA values may be determined. Unlike the
case of eToken, there is no international consensus on defining LoAALoc values.
Table 4.2: A Sample Location Information Versus LoAALoc [2]
Location Alternative Level of Assurance
Zone0
Level0: public area which does not have any provision
for p-authentication.
Zone1
Level1: semi-public area which uses p-authentication to
identify a group of users, e.g. through the use of a shared
building key.
Zone2
Level2: personal area – access to this zone is controlled
by the use of a locker key owned by a single user or a
sensor based user identification (e.g. RFID).
Zone3
Level3: secured personal area – this zone uses some
strong form of physical identification method that is less
vulnerable to theft or loss than locker keys, e.g. Biomet-
rics (physical) authentication facility.
Zone4
Level4: highly secured personal area – this zone may
use multiple physical authentication methods.
Both authentication attributes (i.e. eToken and ALoc) make a direct contri-
bution to the overall assurance level in identifying a user. They could be seen as
a two-factor authentication mechanism. For example, a service provider may use
two authentication services to identify a user; one is the user-name and password
method, and the other is a biometric-based location authentication. As a pass-
word token is more vulnerable to guessing attacks than a PKI credential, using it
inside a secure location with a biometric physical authentication facility may be
comparable, in terms of authentication assurance level, to a PKI credential used
in a public area.
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To quantify the overall assurance level of the two additive attributes, we
introduce the notion of LoAauthN .
Definition 3 LoAauthN is the overall confidence/assurance level associated with
the composite authentication solution consisting of token-based e-authentication
(i.e. eToken) and location-based p-authentication (i.e. ALoc).
The introduction of the authN attribute, and its corresponding LoA definition,
is a major focus of this thesis. The authN attribute may be extended to abstract
all contextual attributes that may impact the level of assurance in identifying a
subject. In this way, the number and the types of the used authentication methods
are not significant on CRAAC access control decision-making. Rather, authN is
the considerable factor that affects access control decision-making. Currently, the
authN attribute only encompasses the eToken and ALoc contextual attributes. As
technology advances, further research may be needed to identify other potential
contextual attributes that may have an impact on the level of assurance in the
authentication method used by a subject.
4.3.3 Communication Channel Security
The level of security protection of the communication channel, linking a subject
and a service provider, may also influence the risk level of unauthorised access.
For instance, if a channel is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, some credentials
sent over the channel may experience a high risk of being compromised. In
addition, the requested data may experience a high risk of being disclosed to
unauthorised entities via channel interceptions. For these reasons, we introduce
the Channel Security (CS) attribute.
Definition 4 LoACS refers to the degree of confidence/assurance in the channel,
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linking a subject and a service provider, in protecting the confidentiality of data
transmitted over it.
Similar to the ALoc attribute, the CS attribute does not have an international
consensus on its assurance level definition. Table 4.3 describes an exemplar setting
of a 5-level LoACS mimicking the NIST’s eToken LoA definition.
Table 4.3: An Examplar Setting of LoACS Values
LoACS Description
Level0 This attribute is disabled, or not used.
Level1 Little or no confidence in channel security.
Level2 Some confidence in channel security.
Level3 High confidence in channel security.
Level4 Very high confidence in channel security.
4.3.4 Access History
A subject’s access history (AH) is an important indicator of a subject’s trustwor-
thiness. A user with repeated authentication failures and/or repeated authorisa-
tion rejections should score a low access history assurance level. By accommodat-
ing AH in access control decision-making, CRAAC may help to deter malicious
attempts and encourage good behaviour among subjects. A user’s access history
attribute stores information about the user’s history related to his/her authen-
tication and authorisation outcomes for a past period. The corresponding LoA
value could be computed, mimicking the NIST work for eToken, as depicted in
Table 4.4. The LoA of a subject’s AH is defined as follows:
Definition 5 LoAAH refers to the degree of confidence/assurance in the access
history of a subject. This encompasses the degree of assurance in authentication
and authorisation history.
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Table 4.4: An Examplar Setting of LoAAH Values
LoAAH Description
Level0 This attribute is disabled, or not used.
Level1 Little or no confidence in the subject’s access history.
Level2 Some confidence in the subject’s access history.
Level3 High confidence in the subject’s access history.
4.4 LoA-to-Weight Conversion (L2WC)Method
Selection
4.4.1 Rationale and Selection Criteria
The attributes’ LoA (i.e. LoAeToken,LoAALoc, LoACS and LoAAH) discussed ear-
lier are ranks (e.g. level1). A LoA rank needs to be converted into rating (i.e.
weight) that corresponds to its significance before it can be used to derive a
subject’s RLoA. In CRAAC, this process is called LoA-to-Weight Conversion
(L2WC).
There are multiple methods that could be used to perform L2WC. However,
the choice of an appropriate conversion method should be in-line with the general
requirements of UbiComp environments. This UbiComp conformance focuses on
non-intrusiveness and performance factors. Since the conversion is performed
on-line, based on the changes of the surrounding contextual information, the
conversion method should be efficient in terms of the time it takes to accom-
plish the conversion. In addition, the use of the capability-restrictive devices in
UbiComp prefers the use of a computationally lightweight conversion method.
In certain cases, the device that performs the conversion may be a PDA with a
low computational power and/or a short battery life. A conversion method that
consumes a lot of resources is not appropriate in this environment. Moreover,
the process should be systematic enough to eliminate human intervention in its
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calculations. Non-intrusiveness is a fundamental requirement in UbiComp [13].
This may be achieved by utilising an “objective“ conversion method that does
not depend heavily on the personal views of, for instance, a central authority and
his/her understanding of the problem.
4.4.2 L2WC Methods
There are multiple methods to perform the L2WC. This includes the Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP), Rank-order, and fuzzy methods. As the fuzzy method
lacks an acceptable ranking method [67], our discussions below focus on AHP and
Rank-order methods.
4.4.2.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process
AHP, proposed by Thomas Saaty [3], is based on mathematics and psychology. It
compares a list of alternatives based on multiple selection criteria. In other words,
AHP can be used to make complex decisions that involve multiple criteria. It
provides assistance to a decision-maker in identifying and weighting the selection
criteria. Ranking and weighting alternatives in order from most to least significant
is an important application of AHP, which is our main aim in studying AHP. The
way in which AHP weighs alternatives can also be used to weigh the LoA ranks
in our problem context. As the main aim here is to show how AHP can be
used to perform L2WC, the following only illustrates the operations required for
performing such a task.
Consider a decision manager needing to make a decision about which soft-
ware product to buy for an organisation. In surveying the market, there are 5
competing companies with 5 different products: A, B, C, D, and E. To select the
best product, the manager selects the AHP technique. AHP requires the decision
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manager to form a hierarchy that models the problem. The hierarchy should
contain the alternatives (i.e. A, B, C, D, and E products) at the base level, and
it should encompass all selection criteria required to evaluate these alternatives
against. Figure 4.1 shows an example hierarchy, where the decision manager lists
a set of four criteria that help to discriminate between those competing products.
AHP in general allows a decision manager to choose a selection criterion that
may be tangible, intangible, accurately measured, or approximately measured.
As shown in Figure 4.1, start-up time, search speed, cost, and ease of use are
the selection criteria the decision manager has identified for the software product
selection.
Choose a software
Start-up Time Search Speed Cost Ease of use
A B C D E
Goal
Selection Criteria 
Alternatives
Figure 4.1: The AHP Hierarchy for the Software Selection Problem
After constructing the AHP hierarchy, the importance of the various selec-
tion criteria has to be evaluated. This is done apart from the software product
alternatives. For example, given the selection criteria level in Figure 4.1, is the
”start-up time“ more important than the ”search speed“ in selecting a software
product? This process actually establishes priorities among the selection criteria
(i.e. ranking) with respect to achieving the goal (i.e. selecting the best software
product). To perform the ranking, all the selection criteria of the hierarchy will
be compared to one another in a pair-wise comparison (i.e. two selection criteria
at a time). For a systematic calculation of the selection criteria relative weights,
Saaty has defined 9 levels of importance as described in Table 4.5. There are
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Table 4.5: The AHP Importance Rating Scale [3]
Importance
intensity
Definition Explanation
1 Equal importance
Two factors contribute equally to
the objective
3 Somewhat more important
Experience and judgement slightly
favour one over the other
5 Much more important
Experience and judgement
strongly favour one over the
other
7 Very much more important
Experience and judgement very
strongly favour one over the other
9 Absolutely more important
The evidence favouring one over
the other is of the highest possible
validity
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values When compromise is needed
multiple expectations from the relative weight calculation process, such as 1) the
importance of all the selection criteria must add up to 1, which is the priority of
the main goal, and 2) the relative importance of the selection criteria (Ci, Cj)
must equal to 1, where i = j. The reason for this is that each selection criterion
is as important as itself. In conducting the pair-wise comparison, the decision
maker can use concrete measures (i.e. objective) or personal judgement (i.e. sub-
jective). For instance, the ”cost“ and the ”start-up time“ could be measured
with absolute certainty. The ”start-up time“, for instance, can be quantitatively
measured by computing the time it takes to start up the application. On the
other hand, the ”ease of use“ may be judged subjectively based on the decision
manager’s own perception of the software application. The results of the pair-
wise comparisons are placed in a matrix, as depicted in Table 4.6. The matrix
shows, for instance, that the ”search speed“ is slightly more important than the
”start-up time“. This is encoded as 3 and 1/3 in the highlighted cells. The
numbers in the matrix represent the relative importance of the selection criteria;
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Table 4.6: The AHP Relative Importance Matrix for Software Selection
start-up time search speed cost ease of use
start-up time 1 1/3 5 1
search speed 3 1 5 1
cost 1/5 1/5 1 1/5
ease of use 1 1 5 1
In other words, they represent the ranks of the selection criteria. The next step
in AHP is to calculate the relative weights for each selection criterion given the
ranks determined in the matrix. This, as shown in Table 4.7, is performed by tak-
ing each entry in the original matrix, shown in Table 4.6, and dividing it by the
sum of the column it appears in. For example, the highlighted (”search speed“,
Table 4.7: The AHP Relative Weights for Software Selection
start-up time search speed cost ease of use Average
start-up time 0.1923 0.1316 0.3125 0.3125 0.2372
search speed 0.5769 0.3947 0.3125 0.3125 0.3992
cost 0.0385 0.0790 0.0625 0.0625 0.0606
ease of use 0.1923 0.3947 0.3125 0.3125 0.3030
”cost“) entry is computed as 5
5+5+1+5
= 0.3125. A new matrix is constructed, as
shown in Table 4.7, that represents the relative weights of the selection criteria.
The matrix, for example, shows that the ”search speed“ is the most important
selection criterion, contributing about 40% to the overall goal. As far as this
thesis is concerned, up to this point AHP can be used to perform the L2WC. The
rest of the AHP operations (i.e. selecting an alternative) are beyond the thesis
scope.
4.4.2.2 Rank-Ordered Weights-Based Methods
The rank-order method is used to generate weights for different alternatives.
Rank-order centroid (ROC) [68], Rank Reciprocal (RR), Rank Exponent (RE),
and Rank Sum (RS) [69] are examples of the rank-order method. This method
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is often used to solve Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) problems.
It takes a set of attributes ordered by importance (i.e. ranks) and converts
them into a set of approximated weights (i.e. ratings). It is worth emphasising
that sometimes it may not be realistic to determine the precise weights of the
attributes [70].
The main difference amongst RS, RR, RE, and ROC is the formula they are
using to approximate the weights of the ranks. RS uses the following formula [69]:
wi =
N − Ri + 1∑N
j=1(N −Rj + 1)
(4.1)
Where N is the number of attributes, Ri is the rank position of the attribute. RR
uses another formula: [69]:
wi =
1/Ri∑N
j=1(1/Rj)
(4.2)
RE uses [69]:
wi =
(N − Ri + 1)
z
∑N
j=1(N − Rj + i)
z
(4.3)
where z is the weight of the most important attribute on a 0-1 scale. This is
an additional piece of information required in RE to compute the weights of the
corresponding attributes. It is worth noting that if z is 1, the RE defaults back
to RS, and if z is 0 that corresponds to the equal weights case.
ROC, originally proposed by Barron in [68], has an appealing theoretical
foundation for its derived weights [71]. It derives weights through a system-
atic analysis of implicit information in the ranks, which would give an accurate
outcome [70]. Using the ROC method, the weights are derived from a simplex
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w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn ≥ 0 restricted to:
n∑
i=1
wi = 1 (4.4)
where n is the number of attributes (system cardinality). The vertices of the
simplex are e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), e2 = (
1
2
, 1
2
, 0, . . . , 0), e3 = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , en =
( 1
n
, 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
). The coordinates of the centroids (i.e. weights) are calculated by
averaging the corresponding coordinates of the defined vertices [70]. In general,
the weight of the kth most important attribute out of n attributes is calculated
as:
wk =
(
∑n
i=k 1/i)
n
(4.5)
For example, consider a set of four attributes: A,B,C, and D ranked as first (i.e.
most important), second, third, and fourth (i.e. least important), respectively.
ROC would compute the weights as: A = (1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4)/4 = 0.5208,
B = (0 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4)/4 = 0.2708, C = (0 + 0 + 1/3 + 1/4)/4 = 0.1458 and,
D = (0 + 0 + 1/4)/4 = 0.0625.
4.4.3 Choosing L2WC Method
Table 4.8 summarises the potential conversion methods surveyed in this research.
The RE method is not appropriate selection, since it requires extra information
(i.e. the weight of the most important attribute) to compute the weights. In
our L2WC problem, such information can not be provided. As seen in the table,
the rank-ordered weights-based methods (i.e. RR, RS, and ROC) show more
accurate results than the AHP method. AHP sometimes produces unreasonable
weights due to its subjective way of weights determination. For example, if A is
more important than B, which is more important than C then A is expected to be
CHAPTER 4. CONTEXT-RISK-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL (CRAAC) 80
more important than C (i.e. transitivity). In AHP, as the pair-wise comparison is
performed on two items at a time, a decision manager may explicitly state that C
is more important than A, which is not sensible. Pair-wise comparison in AHP is
a kind of a stateless process that can not link a current pair-wise comparison with
a previous one. In other words, AHP uses pair-wise comparison that may not
acknowledge the transitivity of relative importance among factors (i.e. selection
criteria). No tool in AHP could be used to prevent such a possibility.
Table 4.8: L2WC Methods Comparison
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AHP Concern O(n2) X
(Objective,non-
intrusive), (Subjec-
tive,intrusive)
Math &
psychology
%
RR Accurate O(n) X Objective, non-intrusive Ad
Hoc [70]
%
RS Accurate O(n) X Objective, non-intrusive Ad
Hoc [70]
%
RE Accurate O(n) X Objective, non-intrusive Ad
Hoc [70]
X
ROC Mostaccurate O(n) X Objective, non-intrusive
Systematic
Analysis of
ranks
%
In addition, AHP can create a rank reversal phenomenon, where adding ir-
relevant alternatives may cause a reversal in the ranking [72]. Moreover, the
static 9-levels rating system proposed by Saaty does not always cope with some
marginal differences of importance [73]. The time complexity of the rank-ordered
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weights-based methods is linear (i.e. O(n)), where n is number of the contex-
tual attributes used. In contrast, in AHP, the number of pair-wise comparisons
is n×(n−1)
2
, where n is the number of attributes. This means the complexity of
AHP is of O(n2). In other words, the number of comparisons conducted in, for
instance, ROC is less than that of AHP [67]. Based on the above considerations,
AHP is excluded as a choice for L2WC.
Comparing ROC against other rank-ordered methods, ROC is more accurate,
and provides an efficient and appropriate implementation tool [70]. The RR and
RS weights calculation process is Ad Hoc [70], whilst in ROC it is based on a
systematic analysis of ranks. Based on the above considerations, ROC is chosen
as the L2WC method in this research. To further reduce the time spent on calcu-
lating weights, a static conversion table can be used. In other words, the weights
of the contextual attributes can be calculated off-line and a table is preloaded
with the weights. On receiving an access request, the access control service can
look up the static table for the weights of the corresponding contextual attributes
instead of calculating the weights in real-time.
4.5 Requester’s LoA Aggregation at Run-Time
As mentioned earlier, the assurance level in identifying a subject may be in-
fluenced by multiple attributes, either directly (e.g. eTokens, ALoc, and AH) or
indirectly (e.g. CS). To quantify the assurance level as influenced by the combina-
tion of a subject’s multiple contextual attributes, the RLoA notion is introduced.
We define RLoA as follows:
Definition 6 RLoA refers to an overall LoA in identifying a subject based upon
the subject’s contextual information that is associated with the subject’s multiple
contextual attributes (i.e. eToken, ALoc, CS, and AH).
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The derivation of RLoA depends on the types of the contextual attributes and
the correlation, or the mutual relationships, amongst the contextual attributes.
Formally, given a set of contextual attributes (A1, A2, . . . , An) and their associ-
ated assurance levels (LoAA1 , LoAA2, . . . , LoAAn), RLoA can be expressed using
a generic function, f , as:
RLoA = f(LoAA1 , LoAA2 , . . . , LoAAn) (4.6)
f is determined by the relationship among the multiple contextual attributes.
We have identified two types of relationships: Elevating and Weakest-link.
4.5.1 Elevating Relationship
In the elevating relationship, the combined use of two or more contextual at-
tributes may result in the overall confidence level being higher than that provided
by any of the individual contextual attributes. The concept of elevating security
is used by Microsoft in Windows Server 2003 to enable regular users to install ap-
plications even if they do not have the required permissions [74]. In our problem
context, the eToken and ALoc attributes (i.e. when used collectively to identify
a user) are in an elevating relationship. In fact, a combined use of e-Token and
ALoc is a two-factor authentication solution that is more reliable than using only
eToken or ALoc alone. Thus, it provides a higher RLoA value.
Given that a requester has n contextual attributes, (A1, A2, . . . , An), all the
attributes are in an elevating relationship, and each of the attribute has a LoA
associated with it, (LoAA1 , LoAA2 , . . . , LoAAn), where 1 > LoAAi > 0, i ∈ {1, n},
then the overall assurance value (i.e. RLoA) can be calculated (using probability
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theory) as [75]:
RLoA = 1− (1− LoAA1)(1− LoAA2) . . . (1− LoAAn) (4.7)
An advantage of Equation 4.7 is that an attribute with a higher assurance
value would have a higher impact on RLoA, and an attribute with a lower as-
surance value would have a lower impact on the overall assurance value. Based
on our knowledge and literature [76], we have observed that, among the set of
attributes {eToken, ALoc, CS, AH}, only eToken and ALoc attributes are in an
elevating relationship. Other attributes are in a weakest-link relationship. Thus,
by applying Equation 4.7 to the eToken and ALoc attributes, LoAauthN can be
calculated as:
LoAauthN = 1− (1− LoAeToken)(1− LoAALoc) (4.8)
Here, LoAauthN is the aggregated LoA produced by the eToken and ALoc
attributes. Replacing the eToken and ALoc attributes with LoAauthN , equation
4.6 can be revised as:
RLoA = f(LoAauthN , LoACS, LoAAH) (4.9)
4.5.2 Weakest-Link Relationship
In the weakest-link relationship the value of RLoA is equal to the lowest attribute
LoA value in the attribute value set. This is in line with the weakest-link principle
in system security. This is because, even if the underlying authentication proce-
dure is strong (thus difficult to impersonate), and the channel security has a high
assurance level (thus difficult to intercept confidential information), provided that
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the service provider’s system is easy to break into, there will be still a high risk of
compromising the server end of the identification and authentication procedure,
e.g. by directly attacking the system credential stores, or by tampering with the
authentication algorithm, etc. This implies that, for a set of attributes that are
in a weakest link relationship, the overall assurance level should not be higher
than the lowest attribute LoA involved.
For example, the attributes authN (i.e. as computed from eToken and ALoc),
CS, and AH, resembles more the weakest-link relationship. The RLoA is calcu-
lated as:
RLoA = min(LoAauthN , LoACS, LoAAH) (4.10)
Where min is the minimum function that returns the smallest LoA value of
those enclosed in the brackets. Note that the calculation of LoAauthN remains
the same, as the eToken and ALoc attributes are in an elevating relationship due
to its two-factor authentication nature.
4.6 CRAAC Modes of Working
CRAAC supports four modes of working; each suits a different application context
and access control requirements. The four modes are:
• RLoA-only Mode: The RLoA value of multiple attributes is used to govern
access control decision-making.
• AttributeLoA-only Mode: The individual LoA values of one or more at-
tributes are used to govern access control decision-making.
• Combined Mode: Both RLoA-only and AttributeLoA-only modes are used
to govern access control decision-making.
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• Basic-RBAC Mode: This corresponds to the traditional RBAC model.
The four modes differ by which the LoA values are used to control access to
sensitive resource objects. However, the basic RBAC mode is fundamental in all
other modes.
4.6.1 RLoA-only Mode
In this mode, resources are classified into groups based on their sensitivity levels.
The resource classification is performed transparently from the set of utilised
contextual attributes. In other words, a resource provider may not need to be
aware of how users will be identified and what contextual attributes are used.
The resource provider only needs to specify a single minimum level of assurance
to release a given resource object (i.e. OLoA). When an access request is received,
the set of contextual information associated with the access requester is assessed.
A corresponding RLoA value is derived based on the set of contextual information.
The access will be granted iff RLoA≥OLoA. In this way, we could adapt an access
control decision in response to the resource object’s sensitivity levels and the
changes in the user’s LoA-affecting contextual information thus, achieving fine-
grained access control. In addition to governing the role-permission assignment,
RLoA can be used to govern the user-role assignment. In other words, in the
RLoA-only mode, RLoA can be used to govern both UA and PA functionalities.
4.6.2 AttributeLoA-only Mode
In this mode of working, access to sensitive resource objects is governed by indi-
vidual contextual attributes’ LoA values. That is, each contextual attribute has
its own AttributeLoA value, which will be used, possibly along with other at-
tributeLoA values, to control access to sensitive resource objects. In other words,
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a service provider can specify a set of LoA requirement on a particular set of con-
textual attributes. An access requester has to satisfy all the LoA requirements
to gain access to the service.
There is a similarity between this mode of working and the CAAC-based
models discussed in Chapter 3. Both use the contextual information as addi-
tional constraints to govern both UA and/or PA functions. But, instead of using
contextual attribute values in the access control policy specification as in CAAC,
the AttributeLoA-only mode uses the attributes’ LoA values. In this way, the
AttributeLoA-only mode hides the way in which contextual information is rep-
resented from the authorisation engine, which provides more flexibility. In other
words, CRAAC generalises the CAAC-based model in the way that it is not re-
quired for the authorisation engine to be aware of the representation method used
to express the contextual information. For example, an access control policy for
a location-aware access control service that uses the ”zones“ representation could
be the same as the one that uses an absolute positioning representation(i.e. lon-
gitude and latitude). In the AttributeLoA-only mode, CRAAC can still utilise a
CAAC-based authorisation engine, used by many existing context-aware systems,
as an external authorisation engine.
4.6.3 Combined Mode
This mode combines the use of the RLoA-only and AttributeLoA-only modes. For
example, in certain application scenarios, an access requester may be assigned a
role based on the RLoA value (i.e. UA function), whereas permissions are granted
based on the individual contextual attributes LoA values (i.e. PA function), or
any other combinations. CRAAC supports such an access control requirement
by proposing the Combined mode of working.
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4.6.4 Basic-RBAC Mode
This mode controls access to sensitive resource objects based solely on the RBAC
model. Identifying an access requester is performed based on the requester’s static
attributes such as ID. This mode is fundamental for all other modes of working.
However, it may be used only when an access control system disables the use of
contextual information. For example, when a location sensor in a location-aware
access control service is switched off. The access control service should, hence,
use a traditional method for access control (i.e. RBAC).
4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has described several important design issues associated with the
design of CRAAC. These issues include the identification of authentication LoA
relevant contextual attributes, their LoA quantification, their mutual relationship
analysis, and the derivation of RLoA. CRAAC uses RLoA as a generic attribute to
capture the composite effect of a subject’s contextual information on the subject’s
assurance level, and uses it to govern the set of permissions assigned to the
subject. By linking RLoA to a resource object sensitivity level, CRAAC not only
achieves context-aware but also risk-aware access control. Most importantly,
through the use of RLoA, CRAAC has successfully decoupled its access control
function from its contextual information management function. Thus, any change
in either functional modules will only require minimum alteration in the other.
This provides the flexibility and generality that CRAAC is seeking. Furthermore,
CRAAC supports four modes of working to satisfy a divergent set of access control
and policy specification requirements, making it applicable in a wide range of
application contexts.
Chapter 5
CRAAC Design Preliminaries
5.1 Chapter Introduction
To realise the CRAAC vision discussed in Chapter 4, a CRAAC architecture is
needed. This architecture should, by proposing functional blocks, support con-
text management, access control decision-making, and LoA derivation services.
This chapter describes the design principles and methods for the CRAAC archi-
tecture. Flexibility, extensibility, generality, high level functional encapsulation,
and LoA-linked fine-grained access control are amongst the design principles of
the CRAAC architecture. To support a LoA-linked fine-grained access control,
CRAAC supports three policy types and two policy retrieval modes. Introduc-
ing the architecture will undoubtedly, increase the overall model complexity. This
may affect the applicability of the CRAAC model and may hinder the acceptabil-
ity of the model by an enterprise. For this reason, CRAAC should be evaluated
against a well-known access control quality metric. This chapter introduces a
quality metric by which CRAAC is assessed. The main elements of the quality
metric are: safety and performance. To measure the CRAAC performance, a
CRAAC prototype has been built. The prototype development environment will
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be described in this chapter.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: -
• Section 5.2 describes the motivations and the design requirements of the
CRAAC architecture.
• Section 5.3 discusses three policy types used by CRAAC.
• It also outlines two different modes of retrieving policy data from an access
control policy store (i.e. push and pull).
• Section 5.4 discuses the evaluation metric by which the CRAAC model is
evaluated. Moreover, it describes the CRAAC evaluation testbed.
• Finally, Section 5.5 summarises the chapter.
5.2 CRAAC Architecture: Motivation and De-
sign Requirements
To realise the CRAAC vision of LoA-linked access control, there is a need for
a supporting architecture. The architecture should acquire contextual informa-
tion from different context sources, quantify the corresponding LoA (i.e. ranks),
convert the LoA ranks into LoA weights (i.e. L2WC) and aggregate the LoA
values into one RLoA value1. Then, it should feed the LoA/RLoA values into the
authorisation decision engine and, finally, produce an access control decision.
The following requirements have been used in the design of the CRAAC ar-
chitecture:
1. LoA-aware
CRAAC should provide built-in services to support the use of individual
1Depending on the configured mode of working
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LoA values (i.e. AttributeLoA values) as well as aggregate LoA values (i.e.
RLoA values) in access control decision-making.
2. Extensibility and Flexibility
The CRAAC architecture should be extensible in order to allow easy ad-
dition of new and removal of obsolete contextual attributes. Any alter-
ations imposed on the architecture caused by such contextual attribute
changes should only be refrained within the context management part of
the CRAAC architecture. Generally, any change occurred in an architec-
tural component should not significantly affect other components in the ar-
chitecture. In addition, an addition/deletion of an architectural component
should impose a minimum change on the rest of the architecture. This prop-
erty can be achieved through functional encapsulation. This is essential for
the CRAAC model to cope with the dynamic nature of the UbiComp envi-
ronments. In addition, the functional encapsulation can make the CRAAC
architecture flexible enough to accommodate different numbers and types
of contextual attributes. The architecture should be applicable to different
application contexts. It should be able to employ both internal as well as
external authorisation decision engines.
3. Efficient performance
The CRAAC architecture should perform efficiently in terms of access de-
lays/latency that a subject has to endure before an access control decision
is made. This also includes streamlining the inter-component communica-
tion to reduce the number of interactions and communication overheads.
Another factor that may affect the performance of the system is scalability.
That is why the performance of CRAAC is investigated when the number of
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enabled roles for a particular user increases2, the number of the contextual
attributes increases3, the access request rates increases4, etc.
4. Standard architectural component design
The CRAAC architecture should comply with relevant standards (e.g. XACML)
in order to provide interoperability with the current solutions.
5.3 CRAAC Policy Types and Access Modes
There are two further design issues: 1) the types of access control policies sup-
ported by CRAAC, and 2) the access mode that is used to retrieve a policy from
its store.
CRAAC recognises three types of access control policies: UA, PA, and re-
sources’ OLoA policies. The UA and PA policies store user-role and role-permission
mappings, respectively. These are the fundamental functions of the basic RBAC
model. A UA policy is relatively smaller than that of PA and it could be stored
in a relational database table for efficient retrieval. A PA policy needs to be ex-
pressed in a standard access control policy language, due to its relatively big size.
In this research, XACML 2.0 [77] is used to express this policy type. However,
the architecture is flexible in order to allow any other policy languages to be used.
CRAAC expresses the UA policy in a 3-tuple format: < Subject, RLoA,Role >,
or in an n-tuple format: < Subject, LoA1...LoAn, Role >, where n is the number
of contextual attributes recognised by the system. The use of 3 or n-tuple policy
format depends on the CRAAC configuration (i.e. mode of working). For exam-
ple, the 3-tuple expression is used in the RLoA-only mode, whereas the n-tuple
is used in the AttributeLoA-only mode.
2See Subsection 6.5.3 for more detail
3See Subsection 7.5.2 for more detail
4See Subsection 6.5.6 for more detail
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The resources’ OLoA policy specifies the minimum LoA requirement upon
which a resource object can be released. This policy is stored in an XML file
and is maintained independently from the other two polices. Figure 5.1 depicts
a snippet of the resources’ OLoA policy for a “Printer” object. The figure shows
the XML file divided into two main elements: OLoA and Individual-OLoA-Set.
The OLoA element contains the OLoA specification that the printer requires to
be released, regardless of the type, number, or representation of the contextual
attributes used. For example, for a subject to cancel the current printing task,
the subject has to satisfy a LoA requirement of at least 0.48. In other words, a
subject has to satisfy this constraint (i.e. RLoA ≥ 0.48) to gain access to the
Printer no matter what contextual attributes the subject has subscribed to. This
element (i.e. OLoA) is used in both RLoA-only and Combined modes.
</ResourceObjects>
<Resource ID="CRAAC:10"  Name="Printer">
<OLoA>       
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="NONE" Permission="SwitchOn"> <Value>0.04</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="NONE" Permission="SwitchOff"><Value>0.04</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="NONE" Permission="print"><Value>0.70</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="NONE" Permission="CancelCurrentTask"><Value>0.48</Value></LoA-Entry>
</OLoA>
<Individual-OLoA-Set>       
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="CS" Permission="SwitchOn"><Value>0.02</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="AH" Permission="SwitchOn"><Value>0.03</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="ALoc" Permission="SwitchOn"><Value>0.01</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="eToken" Permission="SwitchOn"><Value>0.03</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="eToken" Permission="SwitchOff"><Value>0.03</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="CS" Permission="SwitchOff"><Value>0.01</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="CS" Permission="FaxIt"><Value>0.24</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="AH" Permission="FaxIt"><Value>0.20</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="eToken" Permission="FaxIt"><Value>0.40</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="CS" Permission="CancelCurrentTask"><Value>0.24</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="AH" Permission="CancelCurrentTask"><Value>0.40</Value></LoA-Entry>
<LoA-Entry Context-Attribute ="eToken" Permission="CancelCurrentTask"><Value>0.50</Value></LoA-Entry>
</Individual-OLoA-Set>
</Resource>
</ResourceObjects>  
 
Figure 5.1: Snippet of the Resources’ OLoA Policy
On the other hand, the Individual-OLoA-Set element expresses the Printer’s
OLoA requirements in terms of the individual contextual attribute LoA values.
This element of the policy is context-aware, since it needs to know the type
and the number of the contextual attributes used. This element supports the
use of both AttributeLoA-only and Combined modes, since, for example, the
AttributeLoA-only mode utilises individual contextual attributes’ LoA values to
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govern access control decision-making. Table 5.1 summarises which mode of
working uses what type of access control policy.
Table 5.1: CRAAC Modes Vs Policy Files Usage
UA PA
Resources’
OLoA: OLoA
Element
Resources’ OLoA:
Individual-OLoA-Set
RLoA-only Mode X X X %
AttributeLoA-only Mode X X % X
Combined Mode X X X X
Basic-RBAC Mode X X % %
Two policy retrieval modes are recognised by CRAAC: pull and push modes [78].
In the pull mode, an access control policy is retrieved from the corresponding store
on demand. In other words, on receiving an access request, CRAAC opens the
corresponding access control policy file, parses it, and verifies the request against
the policy rules. In the push mode, on the other hand, the access control policy is
pushed into the system before receiving any access request. In other words, in this
access mode, CRAAC is pre-loaded with the policies when it is initialised. The
use of both modes in CRAAC and their implications on the CRAAC performance
will be reported in Chapters 6 and 7.
5.4 CRAAC Evaluation
Evaluating the CRAAC model is required; as an access control system grows in
size, the system complexity grows as well and more overheads may be imposed on
the system. In conducting the CRAAC evaluation, the results of the evaluation
will be compared to those from the traditional RBAC system (i.e. as a reference
model). In fact, evaluating an access control system is challenging. To our best
knowledge, the NIST quality metric [4] is, perhaps, the most well-known metric
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that is used for such a purpose.
The NIST quality metric, as depicted in Table 5.2, does not suggest any tan-
gible measurements, nor does it propose discrete benchmarks, for each metric el-
ement. The NIST quality metric contains elements that verify the administrative
capabilities, administrative cost, policy coverage, extensibility, and performance
quality. The selection of a metric element depends on a decision manager and the
access control system in hand. In this thesis, the NIST quality metric is adopted
as a common basis to assess the CRAAC model. The main focuses of the CRAAC
assessment is on performance and safety elements of the NIST quality metric.
For the CRAAC assessment, a CRAAC prototype has been built, experiments
have been conducted, and results are reported in the next two chapters.
5.4.1 Performance Evaluation
As outlined in Chapter 4, CRAAC is more complex than the traditional RBAC
model. It is anticipated that a CRAAC implementation would add more over-
heads due to its new LoA-linked access control decision-making, hence introduc-
ing additional performance costs. The level of the performance cost should be
investigated comprehensively as an indicator of the CRAAC efficacy. For this
purpose, we measure the performance of CRAAC in terms of the average access
delay (AAD).
Definition 7 AAD represents an average access latency a subject has to wait
before the access request is processed. It is the difference between the time when
an access request is sent and the time when an access control decision is made.
To measure AADs under different configurations, experiments are to be de-
signed. To obtain experimental results with high statistical significance, a large
number of iterations have to be used to eliminate arbitrariness. In other words,
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Table 5.2: NIST Access Control Quality Metric [4]
Element Description
User Management
This describes the steps required for assigning and dis-
assigning user capabilities into the access control system
Object Management
This describes the steps required for assigning and dis-
assigning object access control entries into the access con-
trol system
Least Privilege
To what degree an access control system supports the
least-privilege concept
Access Control Policy
This element is concerned about 1)the number of relation-
ships required to create an access control policy and 2) the
capabilities of policy encapsulation for policy combination,
composition and constraint.
SoD support
Is an access control service support SoD? This is significant
to prevent unintended accesses
Implementation
and Evolution
This describes the degree to which an access control system
is adaptable to the implementation and evolution of access
control policies.
Horizontal Scope
What is the scope of coverage across platforms and appli-
cations an access control system can support? This can
be restated as: is an access control system applicable for
a specific application domain or and is it able to cater for
a wide range of application domains?
Vertical Scope
This is concerned about the level of integration between
an access control system and other systems, such as a
database management system and operation system.
Safety
This describes the capability of an access control system to
enforce safety. This is measured by the number of safety
constraints an access control system can support.
Access Control
Management
This describes the degree of freedom for access control
management. It addresses the need to support different
points of views for managing an access control system.
Performance
This describes the cost of running an access control system
in terms of, for example, the number of operations required
to grant/deny a user access to a certain resource object.
Conflict Resolution
Can an access control system resolve conflicts in access
control policies?
Flexibility
This describes the level of flexibility in configuring an ac-
cess control system. This may measure how modular an
access control system is to support an external component.
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to ensure statistical significance, the number of iterations (denoted as n), over
which the AAD is measured, needs to be determined. The larger the value of n,
the less the effect of arbitrariness on the AADs. To determine n, an experiment
is conducted by setting n to different values while measuring the AADs in mil-
liseconds. A certain value of n, at which the arbitrariness tends to disappear, is
selected and used in all subsequent experiments. This will be shown in Section
6.5.
5.4.2 Security Evaluation
Safety is important in any access control system. An access control system is
said to be safe if no permissions are leaked to an unauthorised entity [4]. In fact,
this definition of safety does not address a case where a legitimate user is given
a permission inadvertently. For example, if an access control system grants a
legitimate teller, at a bank counter, a signature authorisation capability at the
same time, thus the access control system is not safe. Therefore, this definition
of safety is incomplete. In this thesis, safety of an access control configuration is
defined as follows:
Definition 8 The safety of an access control system refers to a system state
where no permission is leaked to an unauthorised entity nor to a legitimate entity
unintentionally.
Theoretically, safety is proven undecidable [79]. In fact, safety is achieved by
using a limited access control models or via constraints [80, 4]. An access control
system should support safety by other practical mechanisms such as constraints.
Although this means that there is no automatic proof of safety. It is still possible
to give a manual proof of safety of an access control model [81, 82, 37]. In general,
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SSD and DSD are the practical ways to enforce safety of an access control con-
figuration. Since CRAAC is built on the RBAC model, CRAAC supports safety
by utilising both SSD and DSD constraints. Thus CRAAC should be at least as
safe as the RBAC model in the same access control configuration. In fact, it is
assumed that the complexity of the CRAAC will not impose security loophole or
reduces the overall system security. Moreover, the contextual information along
with the provider are part of the TCB. In fact, CRAAC safety regarding DoS
attacks will be investigated in Section 6.5.7 later on.
CRAAC further enforces safety by introducing the LoA constraints. Thus, no
permission is granted to a subject unless the subject has satisfied certain LoA
requirements. In fact, the LoA constraints provide a higher level of safety than
that of the RBAC model. For example, in the RBAC system, Eve can break
into the system by only compromising Bob’s login credential (e.g. user-name
and password), whereas in CRAAC, she has to compromise more access con-
trol barriers, such as being in a certain known secure location and/or possessing
other stronger authentication credentials. By using the SSD, DSD, and LoA con-
straints, CRAAC should be able to eliminate the possibility of permission leakage
to an unauthorised entity and unintended permissions to a legitimate entity.
By expressing an access control policy in terms of LoA instead of the contex-
tual attributes, CRAAC reduces the effect of compromising policy stores on the
overall system security. In a CAAC-based access control policy, compromising
the policy store provides an attacker a comprehensive knowledge of the system
and what contextual constraints he/she needs to satisfy in order to gain access
to a particular resource object. However, in CRAAC, even if the policy store was
compromised, the attacker will not know which contextual attributes he/she has
to compromise to provide the required OLoA for the resource object. In addition,
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he/she will not even know the set of contextual attributes5 a legitimate subject
has subscribed to. This increases the overall security of the CRAAC model.
5.4.3 CRAAC Evaluation TestBed
As mentioned earlier, the CRAAC prototype has been built as a proof of concept
and as a platform to conduct performance assessments and security evaluation.
The prototype is hosted on Ubuntu 9.04 operating system on a DELL desktop
with 2x Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz processors with 1017MB mem-
ory. The prototype is implemented as a Java desktop application with JavaTMSE
Runtime Environment build 1.6.0 13b03. It uses MySQL 5.0.75 to store UA (i.e.
both static and dynamic) and high-level contextual attribute values (i.e. emula-
tion). This part is assumed to be part of the TCB, since it deals with contextual
information and providers. The prototype uses JbossXACML 2.0.3 [83] for PA
policy evaluation. In fact, this corresponds to the traditional RBAC authorisa-
tion engine. Other CRAAC policies (i.e. the resources’ OLoA requirements, the
RLoA derivation methods, and system configuration parameters) are written in
XML 1.0 and are parsed using SAXParser [84].
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has discussed the motivations and design preliminaries of the CRAAC
architecture. The chapter has also highlighted the policy types and policy re-
trieval modes supported by CRAAC. In addition, CRAAC evaluation has been
discussed. CRAAC is said to be at least as safe as RBAC, since it uses practi-
cal tools such as SSD, DSD, and LoA constraints to control access to protected
resource objects. The next two chapters will study the CRAAC model in two
5In case of the RLoA-only mode
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modes of working (i.e. RLoA-only and AttributeLoA-only mode) along with an
investigation of their performance.
Chapter 6
The RLoA-only Mode
6.1 Chapter Introduction
There is a need for an architecture to realise the LoA-aware access control vi-
sion discussed in the previous chapters. The architecture should support the four
modes of working1 proposed by CRAAC. This chapter describes the design of
the CRAAC architecture along with its components. It also shows in detail how
the RLoA-only mode uses the architecture to support its services (i.e. controlling
access to resources using RLoA). In addition, this chapter investigates and eval-
uates the performance of the RLoA-only mode against that of the basic-RBAC
mode.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: -
• Section 6.2 introduces the CRAAC architecture.
• Section 6.3 discusses the design of the architecture in detail covering its
fundamental services and components.
• Section 6.4 shows how the RLoA-only mode uses the CRAAC architecture
1See Section 4.6 for more detail
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to control access to resource objects using RLoA.
• Section 6.5 investigates the performance of the RLoA-only mode and com-
pare it against the performance of the basic-RBAC mode.
• Section 6.6 summarises the chapter.
6.2 The Architecture Overview
CRAAC classifies its services into three major functional blocks: Access Con-
trol Infrastructure (ACI), Context Management Infrastructure (CMI), and LoA
Derivation Infrastructure (LoADI). The LoADI is responsible for calculating
users’ LoA/RLoA value(s) based upon the latest contextual information fed from
the CMI. It feeds those values to the ACI in order to make access control deci-
sions for the corresponding user. This design approach separates the functions of
access control from that of context management by introducing a layer of abstrac-
tion (i.e. LoADI) to loosely bridge both infrastructures. This approach provides
a high degree of separation of duties among the major functional blocks and a
high level of functional encapsulation, which leads to flexibility and extensibility
of the overall architecture. This may also add another level of complexity spe-
cially when the CRAAC is deployed as a distributed service. Efforts have been
made to stream-line the inter-component communication to reduce the number
of interactions and communication overheads.
The major functional blocks of the CRAAC architecture are outlined in Figure
6.1, and the RLoA-only mode inter-component communication is illustrated in
Figure 6.2. The following section gives a detailed description of the three CRAAC
infrastructures with an emphasis on those architectural components that are used
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Figure 6.1: CRAAC Architectural Components
6.3 The Architecture in Detail
6.3.1 Access Control Infrastructure (ACI)
The ACI encompasses components for both authentication and authorisation.
CRAAC does not specify or require a specific authentication service. Rather,
any existing authentication service can be plugged into the architecture. The
CRAAC authorisation service is built upon the traditional RBAC model and
uses standard access control components like Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
and Policy Decision Point (PDP). CRAAC, yet, adds additional components
such as Master PDP, LoA-aware PDPs and their Coordinator, and RLoA-based
PDPs to provide the novel CRAAC authorisation services.
Generally, the fundamental role of a PEP is to enforce an access control deci-
sion made by a PDP. In CRAAC, PEP receives an access request from a subject,
extracts the attribute values contained in the access request, packages these values
along with the attribute names in a standard XACML 2.0 request context [77],
and forwards them to the Master PDP for evaluation. Then, it enforces the
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if any. CRAAC supports three types of PDPs: RBAC-based, LoA-aware, and
RLoA-based PDPs.
The RBAC-based PDPs are used to perform the traditional RBAC func-
tions such as UA and PA. PDPRBAC−I is dedicated for the former function and
PDPRBAC−II is responsible for the latter function. These PDPs are fundamental
in any CRAAC mode of working.
The LoA-aware PDPs and their Coordinator are used to support an appli-
cation scenario where individual contextual attributes’ LoA values are used to
grant/deny access to resource objects (i.e. the AttributeLoA-only and Combined
modes). Thus, for each contextual attribute, a separate LoA-aware PDP is re-
quired. CRAAC currently uses three LoA-aware PDPs: PDPCS, PDPAuthN , and
PDPAH . PDPCS is a decision engine where decisions are made based upon re-
questers’ levels of assurance in their channel security attribute. PDPAH is a
decision point that supports history-aware access control. Finally, PDPAuthN is
a dedicated authorisation decision engine that supports access control policies
based on both eToken and ALoc attributes.
Since the LoA-aware PDPs operate on LoA values calculated at the LoADI,
there is a need for a service that acquires the LoA values from the LoADI. There
are two design alternatives for this service. One is to let each LoA-aware PDP
to directly communicate with the LoADI. This option may impose a high level
of communication overhead on the LoADI. This is because a requester may sub-
scribe to multiple contextual attributes, then multiple LoA-aware PDPs will be
involved each of which will have to establish an independent communication link
with the LoADI. Excessive communication burden on the LoADI may increase
access delays slowing down the performance and reducing the responsiveness of
the CRAAC model. In addition, this design option violates the high functional
encapsulation requirement that CRAAC aims at achieving. In fact, any change
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in the number of the LoA-aware PDPs will be visible to the LoADI. Therefore,
CRAAC adopts another design option, where a LoA-aware PDP Coordinator is
introduced to coordinate the communications between the LoA-aware PDPs and
the LoADI and between the LoA-aware PDPs and the Master PDP.
The third class of PDPs is the RLoA-based PDPs that include PDPRLoA−I and
PDPRLoA−II . These PDPs perform the functions of role and permission adapta-
tion based upon RLoA. When making an access request, a user is, firstly, assigned
a static role by PDPRBAC−I using the user’s static attribute(s). The static role
may be dynamically adjusted to another role if the user’s RLoA satisfies a cer-
tain threshold. This RLoA-linked role adjustment is performed by PDPRLoA−I .
Similarly, PDPRLoA−II adaptively adjusts access permissions based on the user’s
RLoA value. It is worth emphasising that the RLoA-based PDPs are only used
in both RLoA-only and Combined modes. Another PDP that is relevant to this
context, the PDPattributeLoA. The PDPattributeLoA is a decision point that performs
the same function as PDPRLoA−I , but in the AttributeLoA-only mode. It gen-
erates a user’s dynamic role based on the user’s individual contextual attribute
LoA values instead of the an RLoA value as in the RLoA-only mode.
When an access request is received, the Master PDP needs to be aware of the
corresponding PDPs that should be used for the request. In fact, there is a need
for a component to store such information. The System Configuration Repository
(SCR) is, hence, used for this purpose. The SCR also contains protocol identifiers
to indicate the type of the communication protocol each PDP uses (i.e. currently
CRAAC supports XACML 2.0 request/response context).
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6.3.2 LoA Derivation Infrastructure (LoADI)
The main functions performed by the LoADI are to derive LoA and RLoA values
based on the requester’s contextual information and to feed the values to the
ACI. It has three main components: the LoA Provider, Attribute LoA Derivator
and LoA Aggregator. The Attribute LoA Derivator derives a LoA value for a
given contextual attribute. The composite effect on a user’s LoA, when multiple
attributes are involved, are assessed by the LoA Aggregator. Once LoA/RLoA
values are calculated, the LoA Provider is responsible for sending them to the ACI
for access control decision-making. Basically, the LoADI plays an intermediary
role bridging both ACI and CMI.
The Attribute LoA Derivator receives the contextual attribute values (i.e. in
terms of LoA ranks) from the LoA Provider. It then calculates the corresponding
LoA values (i.e. L2WC) before sending the LoA values back to the LoA Provider.
The LoA Aggregator is responsible for aggregating all LoA values into one
RLoA value, which will be used to control access to resource objects2. This
component receives LoA values computed by the Attribute LoA Derivator. Then,
it queries the LoADR for the possible aggregation method (i.e. Weakest-link or
Elevating) to use before aggregating the LoA values into one RLoA value. Finally,
it sends the RLoA value back to the LoA Provider.
6.3.3 Context Management Infrastructure (CMI)
A context-aware application may interface a diverse range of devices such as sen-
sors, software applications, and other context-aware components. CRAAC uses
the notion of logical sensors [85] to refer to all devices, entities, or software compo-
nents that sense or provide contextual data. Examples of logical sensors currently
2In the RLoA-only mode
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supported by CRAAC include those for monitoring channel security levels, sens-
ing eToken assurance levels, detecting access locations, and tracking users’ access
history. In fact, CRAAC extends the definition of logical sensors to include an
interpretation service that generalises high level contextual information from the
row contextual data acquired from the sensors. For example, an interpretation
service may receive location information in terms of zones and, then, maps the
zones into the corresponding LoA (i.e. ranks). It is worth emphasising that the
interpretation function may vary depending on the type of the contextual at-
tribute and the representation of its value. This is why an interpretation service
is encapsulated inside a logical sensor, instead of using a central interpretation
service for all sensors.
CRAAC introduces the Context Coordinator in order to provide an interface
for the LoADI to access the contextual information from the logical sensors trans-
parently. Indeed, the Context Coordinator hides the design, implementation, and
configuration details of logical sensors from the LoADI. As this thesis focuses on
the use of the contextual information for access control, the component design of
the CMI is beyond the scope.
6.4 RLoA-only Mode Data-Flow
In this section, a detailed illustration of the steps and messages exchanged in
the RLoA-only mode is given through a case study. The case study assumes a
legitimate user, Bob, is trying to get a “Write” access on the “srv.config” file
object. Figure 6.3 illustrates the data-flow of this access request using the RLoA-
only mode.
Given Figures 6.2, the following describes both steps and message exchange
required to grant/deny Bob’s access to the requested resource object:
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Figure 6.3: Data-flow in the RLoA-only Mode
1. Bob sends an access request to PEP for a “Write“ permission on the
“srv.config“ file object. Before that, an authentication phase should take
place in order to verify the identity of Bob. The outcome of the authen-
tication phase is recorded in the eAuthN logical sensor’s repository. If the
authentication fails, the access request is denied, otherwise proceed to next
step.
2. PEP forwards the access request to the Master PDP for an authorisation
decision.
3. The Master PDP sends the subject ID (i.e. Bob) to PDPRBAC−I that
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determines Bob’s static role using the traditional RBAC model (i.e. UA
function).
4. PDPRBAC−I queries PIPRBAC for Bob’s static role.
5. PIPRBAC−I returns the static role of Bob (i.e. Staff).
6. PDPRBAC−I forwards Bob’s static role, Staff, to the Master PDP.
7. The Master PDP sends a context-aware access request to the LoA-aware
PDP Coordinator. In fact, the Coordinator will not consult any subordi-
nate LoA-aware PDPs as no access control decision is expected from the
LoA-aware PDPs in this mode of working. Instead, the LoA-aware PDP
Coordinator initialises the LoADI in order to start LoA/RLoA derivation
for Bob.
8. The LoA-aware PDP Coordinator queries the SCR for the current system
settings. The system settings include the context-awareness flag which in-
dicates the state of the context awareness (i.e. enabled/disabled) and the
mode the system is configured to use. In addition, it queries the SCR for
the types of contextual attributes that Bob has subscribed to.
9. The SCR sends the current settings to the LoA-Aware PDP Coordinator.
For instance, the context awareness flag is enabled, the system is configured
to use the RLoA-only mode and the list of contextual attributes that Bob
has subscribed to is {eToken, ALoc, AH, CS}.
10. The LoA-Aware PDP Coordinator sends an RLoA request to the LoA
Provider passing it, as an argument, the types of the contextual attributes
Bob has subscribed to. In fact, this step transfers the control to the LoADI.
The LoA Provider acts as an interface to the LoADI. It receives requests
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for RLoA derivation and forwards the RLoA value back to the LoA-aware
PDP Coordinator.
11. The LoA Provider sends a request to the Context Coordinator to retrieve
Bob’s up-to-date contextual attributes values. The Context Coordinator
consults its logical sensors for such values. Once the values are ready, it
sends them back to the LoA Provider.
12. The LoA Provider forwards the attribute values to the Attribute LoA
Derivator in order to derive the corresponding LoA values (i.e. L2WC).
To perform L2WC, the Attribute LoA Derivator consults the Level of As-
surance Derivation Repository (LoADR) for the corresponding contextual
attribute cardinalities.
13. Once the attribute LoA values are calculated by the Attribute LoA Deriva-
tor, they are sent back to the LoA Provider, which forwards them to the
LoA Aggregator.
14. The LoA Aggregator consults the LoADR for the aggregation method (e.g.
Weakest-link or Elevating) that should be used for generating the RLoA
value from the set of the attribute LoA values received from the LoA
Provider. Once the RLoA value is calculated, the LoA Aggregator for-
wards it to the LoA Provider, which sends it back to the LoA-aware PDP
Coordinator that transfers it back to the Master PDP.
15. There is a need to check if Bob’s static role should be adjusted (i.e. dynamic
UA) based on the received RLoA value. Thus, the Master PDP consults
the PDPRLoA−I that checks the PIPLoA for a role adaptation. The new
role (i.e. dynamic role), if any, will be sent back to the Master PDP.
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16. The Master PDP forwards Bob’s access request to the PDPRLoA−II . The
request contains Bob’s RLoA value, role (i.e. either the static or dynamic
one), the object to be accessed (i.e. srv.config), and the access mode (i.e.
Write). The access request is encapsulated in an XACML 2.0 request con-
text object.
17. The PDPRLoA−II then performs the following operations to reach an access
control decision based on the attribute values received:
(a) Checks if Bob’s RLoA value is greater than or equal to the OLoA
value required by srv.config. To do this, it queries the PIPLoA for the
”srv.config” OLoA requirement. If the check succeeds, it performs the
next step, otherwise a deny decision is generated.
(b) Checks whether Bob’s current role is permitted to have a “Write“
access on “srv.config“. If this check fails, a deny decision is generated,
otherwise, a grant decision is made.
(c) The generated decision (i.e. grant/deny) is sent to the Master PDP.
18. The Master PDP forwards the access control decision received from the
PDPRLoA−II to the PEP for actual enforcement.
19. It is worth emphasising that the authorisation result (i.e. grant/deny) is
recorded in the access history logical sensors’ local repository in order to
keep Bob’s access history up-to-date.
6.5 RLoA-only Mode Performance Evaluation
This section investigates and compares the performance of the RLoA-only mode
and the basic-RBAC mode. The performance is measured in terms of AADs
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using experiments. The effect of the following factors is investigated: different
PA policy sizes, pull and push policy retrieval modes, the number of enabled roles
of an access requester, the RLoA value, and the queuing delays.
To ensure statistical significance in the experiments, the number of iterations
(denoted as n) over which an AAD is measured should be determined. An ex-
periment has been conducted by setting n to different values while measuring
the AADs in milliseconds. Figure 6.4 shows the results of this experiment that
indicates the bigger the value of n, the less effect the other initialisation factors
have on the AADs. The trend of the graph shows an n value higher than 2.8k
(i.e. 2800 iterations) is sufficient, thus all subsequent experiments use an n value
of 3000.
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Figure 6.4: The Number of Iterations Determination
6.5.1 The Effect of the PA Policy Size
This experiment investigates the effect of the PA policy size on the AAD in the
RLoA-only mode. It assumes a user, Bob, with one enabled role, Staff, makes
six access requests to six different resource objects. The six access requests are
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denoted as R1 through R6 with PA policy sizes of 3.8, 35.6, 206.3, 306.0, 407.7,
and 511.8 KBytes, respectively. Moreover, the experiment assumes that the PA
policies only use permit rules and the algorithm used to combine the rules is
deny-override [77]. The experiment also assumes Bob’s RLoA value is always
greater than or equal to the required OLoA values of the requested resource
objects across the six cases. The latter assumption ensures the execution of the
RLoA-only mode always reaches the stage where the PA policy files are opened.
Because if the RLoA < OLoA, a deny decision will be generated immediately
without checking the PA policy (Step 17 in Section 6.4). The former assumption
enforces every rule contained in the PA policy to be evaluated before making an
access control decision. Thus, the experiment precisely captures the effect of the
PA policy size on the AAD.
Prior to the experiment, two main results are anticipated. Firstly, the larger
the PA policy, the longer it takes to evaluate an access request in both RLoA-only
and basic-RBAC modes. This is because the larger the XACML policy file, the
longer it takes for the system to parse the policy and evaluate the contained rules.
Secondly, the amount of overhead introduced by the RLoA-only mode additional
functions should be consistent and should be almost the same across the 6 policy
sizes. In other words, if the RLoA-only mode adds ∆ti to the AADbasic−RBAC in
request i, then it should add ∆tj to request j, where i 6= j and ∆ti ≈ ∆tj . This
is because, the total access delay for the RLoA-only mode is: AADRLoA−only =
AADRLoAcalculation+AADOLoAcheck+AADbasic−RBAC , where AADRLoAcalculation is
the time taken to calculate RLoA, AADOLoAcheck is the time taken to evaluate
the requester’s RLoA against the requested object’s OLoA, and AADbasic−RBAC
is the time taken for user-role mapping (i.e. UA function) and role-permission
determination (i.e. PA function). The difference of AADs in the RLoA-only and
basic-RBAC modes (i.e. ∆t) is (AADRLoAcalculation + AADOLoAcheck), which is
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independent of the PA policy size.
Figure 6.5 shows the results of the experiment. The figure shows two sets of
AADs measured in milliseconds against the six different access requests. One set
is from the basic-RBAC mode and the other is from the RLoA-only mode. Three
observations can be made from the figure. Firstly, the AADs in both modes
increase steadily as the PA policy size increases. This observation is in line with
our expectation.
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Figure 6.5: The PA Policy Size Effect: RLoA-onlypull vs basic-RBAC
Secondly, the average AAD introduced by the additional RLoA-only mode
functions across the six access requests is about 6.26% of the AAD taken in
the basic-RBAC mode. This observation indicates that in RLoA-only mode, the
majority part of the AAD is caused by the basic RBAC functions. The execution
of the additional CRAAC functions in this mode only contributes a small part
towards the total average access delay.
Thirdly, the AAD difference between the RLoA-only mode and basic-RBAC
mode fluctuates across the 6 access requests. The experimental results show the
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difference values for R1 through R6 fluctuate between 2.6 to 20.2 milliseconds
and the difference values for R1, R2, and R3 are smaller than that for the other
requests. After in-depth examinations and analysis of the RLoA-only mode op-
erations and the experimental results, the following can explain this unexpected
finding. The two additional functions performed by the RLoA-only mode are:
(1) the dynamic role adaptation, which includes tasks of RLoA derivation and
role adjustment, (2) the comparison of a user’s RLoA value against the required
resource’s OLoA value. The former function introduces a constant time overhead.
This is because dynamic roles are stored in a relational database and the time
taken to retrieve a new role from the database should be almost the same across
the six access requests. In addition, the LoA calculation and RLoA aggregation
are expected to be the same for the same user on the same set of contextual at-
tributes. However, the latter function (i.e. point (2)) introduces a variable time
overhead. This is because the latter function uses the resources’ OLoA policy file,
which is written in XML3. Hence, CRAAC needs to parse this file to get the re-
quired OLoA value. The time it takes to get the OLoA value varies depending on
the relative location of the requested resource object in the file. For instance, the
time it takes to get the OLoA value of the first resource object in the resources’
OLoA policy file is considerably less than the time taken to get the OLoA value
of the last resource object stored in the same file. To summarise, accessing the
resources’ OLoA policy file introduces a variable non-negligible level of access
delay, which depends on the relative position of the requested object in the file.
This observation has motivated us to investigate how to reduce the variability in
AAD. For this reason, the use of pull mode versus push mode for the resources’
OLoA policy file has been evaluated.
3See Section 5.3 for more detail
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6.5.2 The Effect of Resources’ OLoA Policy Size: Push
Vs Pull
One way to reduce the access delays introduced by the RLoA-only mode addi-
tional functionality is, perhaps, to have the resources’ OLoA policy pushed into
the system when the system initialises. Thus, at run time when an access request
is received, CRAAC can do a memory access instead of a disk access (i.e. instead
of opening and parsing the resources’ OLoA XML policy file) in order to get the
required OLoA value. Since memory operations take significantly less time than
disk operations, using the push mode is expected to cut down the AADs, thus
providing a better performance. Based upon this belief, a further experiment is
conducted to investigate the level of performance enhancement when using the
push mode for accessing the resources’ OLoA policies. The results are plotted in
Figure 6.6.
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The following observations can be seen from Figure 6.6. Firstly, the overhead
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incurred in accessing and parsing the resources’ OLoA policy is the major contrib-
utor to the AAD difference between the two modes. In other words, AADOLoAcheck
plays a predominant role in the total value of (AADRLoAcalculation+AADOLoAcheck).
When using the push mode, the AADOLoAcheck value is reduced exhibiting ap-
proximately the same value of (AADRLoAcalculation+AADOLoAcheck) across the six
access requests. Secondly, the push mode makes the RLoA-only mode marginally
more expensive than the basic-RBAC mode in terms of AADs. For example, the
AADRLoA−onlypull for R2 was about 6.97% higher than AADbasic−RBAC , but when
the push mode is used, this figure is reduced to about 3.04%. Averaged over the
six access requests, the figure is reduced from about 6.26% in the pull mode to
1.75% in the push mode.
As a conclusion, the performance of the RLoA-only mode is comparable to
that of the basic-RBAC mode and the difference between the two modes is almost
negligible when the push mode is used for accessing the resources’ OLoA policy.
6.5.3 The Effect of the Number of Enabled Roles
In real-life situations, a subject may hold multiple organisational roles. For ex-
ample, a lecturer may also be in charge of the admission task within the school.
An experiment is conducted to evaluate the performance of the RLoA-only mode
when a multiple number of enabled roles (i.e. 1, 2, 4, 10, and 30 enabled roles)
are assigned to a subject (e.g. Bob). The experiment assumes all Bob’s access
requests are on the same resource object. In addition, it uses the push mode
to access the resources’ OLoA policy file. Figure 6.7 shows the results of the
experiment.
The general trend of the graph in Figure 6.7 indicates that the AAD increases
linearly as the number of enabled roles increases. The more enabled roles Bob
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Figure 6.7: RLoA-onlypush: the Effect of the Number of Enabled Roles
holds, the longer it takes to process his access requests. For example, when Bob
holds only one role, the AAD is about 50.3 milliseconds and when he holds 30
roles, the AAD is about 54.5 milliseconds. This 8.4% increase in AAD (e.g. as the
number of roles increases from 1 to 30) is not as significant as in the case where
the size of the PA policy increases. For example, when the size of the PA policy
increases only by about 9 times4, the AAD increases by about 32%. In fact, the
marginal increase in AAD, as the result of increasing the number of enabled roles,
is due to the fact that the operations required here are memory operations not disk
operations. In other words, once the corresponding PA policy is processed (i.e.
either in push or pull mode), the rules contained in the policy will be compared
against the set of enabled roles of the access requester. The comparison does not
require any further policy manipulations (i.e. disk operations).
6.5.4 The Effect of the Attribute LoA Derivator
In this experiment, the effect of the Attribute LoA Derivator is evaluated. In fact,
this experiment assesses the cost of the L2WC method (i.e. ROC) on the AAD,
4From 3.8 to 35.6 KByte in Figure 6.6
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since the fundamental function of the Attribute LoA Derivator is to compute the
LoA values for the contextual attributes given their corresponding ranks. The
experiment runs 5 access requests R1 through R5 made by an access requester
(i.e. Bob). To emphasis the effect of the Attribute LoA Derivator, Bob is assumed
to request the same resource object in all the 5 runs. This eliminates the effect
of the PA policy size on the AADs. In addition, Bob is subscribed to a set of
contextual attributes, namely ALoc, eToken, CS and AH. The experiment uses
the ALoc attribute to evaluate the effect of the L2WC. Thus, changing the ALoc
rank in every access request should capture the effect of the L2WC on the AAD.
For this purpose, the experiment assumes the access location space is divided
into 1000 zones, where zone1 is the most secured zone and zone1000 is the least
secured one. The 1000 zones are, in fact, the ALoc attribute cardinality. It is
also assumed that each access request is made from a different zone (i.e. different
ALoc rank). This means that after each access session, Bob roams to a new
zone before starting a new access session. That is, when receiving R1, R2, R3,
R4, and R5, the ALocBob will be zone1, zone100, zone500, zone800, and zone1000,
respectively. The results of this experiment is depicted in Figure 6.8.
The figure shows the AADs in milliseconds for 5 access requests made by Bob
on the same resource object. Each access request varies in ALoc value (i.e. 1,
100, 500, 800, and 1000), but operates on the same ALoc attribute cardinality
(i.e. 1000). As can be seen from the graph, the AADR1 > AADR2 > AADR3 >
AADR4 > AADR5. In other words, the more secure the zone is, the longer it
takes to reach an access control decision. This is understandable, since the ROCs
will require more iterations to compute the corresponding LoA value. However,
the overhead cost introduced by the LoA derivation process is insignificant. The
AADR1 is about 1% higher than that of AADR5, which is negligible. This confirms
our observation made in Subsection 4.4.3 that ROC is a lightweight algorithm
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Figure 6.8: RLoA-onlypush: the Effect of the Attribute LoA Derivator
suitable for UbiComp environments.
6.5.5 The Effect of the LoA Aggregator
As discussed in Chapter 4, two RLoA aggregation methods are used: Weakest-link
and Elevating. This experiment investigates the run-time costs of the two meth-
ods. The experiment runs 4 access requests made by Bob on the same resource
object in two run sets. The first set assumes all Bob’s contextual attributes are in
a Weakest-link relationship and the second set assumes they are in an Elevating
relationship. Each of the 4 access request is assumed to operate on a different set
of contextual attributes. That is, in the first access request, Bob is subscribed to
only one contextual attribute. In the second, third, and fourth access requests,
Bob is subscribed to 2, 3, and 4 contextual attributes, respectively.
Figure 6.9 depicts the results of the experiment. It shows two sets of AADs
measured in milliseconds against four different access requests. The first set (i.e
setA) represents a scenario where all the contextual attributes of Bob are in a
Weakest-link relationship, whereas in the second set (i.e. setB) the contextual
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attributes are in an Elevating relationship. The following observations can be
made from the figure.
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Figure 6.9: The Effect of the LoA Aggregator on the RLoA-only mode AADs
Firstly, in both sets, the more contextual attributes Bob is subscribed to, the
longer it takes to reach an access control decision. This is because, as shown in
Section 4.5, the more contextual attributes involved in RLoA aggregation, the
longer time it takes the LoA Aggregator to perform the aggregation. If R1 is
excluded, the AAD in both sets increases linearly. This behaviour confirms the
linear (i.e. O(n)) the complexity of both aggregation methods.
Secondly, the AAD of setA is slightly shorter than that of setB. This is
because the Weakest-link security relationship (e.g. setA) requires only boolean
operations to find the minimum, which takes less time than the multiplications
and subtractions required in case of the Elevating relationship.
Finally, it can be seen from Figure 6.9 that the effect of LoA Aggregator (i.e.
in both sets) on the AAD in the RLoA-only mode is insignificant. This indicates
the RLoA-only mode performs lightweight operations when aggregating the LoA
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values into one RLoA value in both Weakest-link and Elevating relationships.
6.5.6 The Effect of the Queuing Delays
In all previous experiments, access delays as caused by queuing has not been
studied. The previous experiments assume an access request is received after the
previous one is completely processed. The main reason for this was to evaluate the
effect of the individual architectural components on the overall AAD. However,
access requests in a real-life scenario may need to be queued, since they may arrive
at a rate higher than the rate the system takes to process an access request. As
a result, users will experience a higher level of AADs. Obviously, the higher the
access request arrival rate, the longer a subject would have to wait before his/her
access request is processed, thus the longer the AADs.
The average access delay experienced by an access requester typically consists
of two components: the queuing delay time (tq) and the processing time (tp). The
former is the time an access request spends in the queue waiting to be processed,
whereas the latter is the time the system takes to process the access request. In
other words, AAD = tp+tq. The effect of tp on AADs has been discussed in detail
in the previous experiments. This experiment, however, evaluates the effect of tq
on the overall AAD.
The experiment tries to answer the following questions:
1. What is the turning point (i.e. threshold) beyond which the queue starts
to build up?
The threshold is the point beyond which the RLoA-only mode is expected
to perform slowly (i.e. in terms of overall AADs). In case of excessive
delay, there may be a need to add more authorisation servers to process
access requests simultaneously. Thus, it is required to determine whether
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the RLoA-only mode needs multiple servers. This is achieved by knowing
the turning point.
2. Is tq in RLoA-only mode comparable to the one of the basic-RBAC mode?
The following assumptions and system set-up are used in the experiment:
1. The experiment uses a first-come-first-served queue and process only one
access request at a time. That is, all access requests are processed sequen-
tially by one authorisation server.
2. All access requests are made on the same resource object. This assumption
eliminates the effect of the PA policy size on the overall AADs, therefore
emphasising the queuing delay effect on the AADs.
3. The push mode is used to access the resource’s OLoA policy.
The experimental results are plotted in Figure 6.10. The figure shows two sets
of AADs measured in milliseconds against seven different rates of access request
arrival rates (i.e. 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100, and 1000 access request per second). One
set is from the basic-RBAC mode and the other is from the RLoA-only mode.
As can be seen from Figure 6.10, the turning point beyond which the queue
starts to build up is around the access rate of 30 access requests per second in
both modes. The average access delay increases steadily when the arrival rate goes
beyond this point. This is because, from this point onwards, the average interval
between access request arrivals is shorter than the average request processing
time. For example, when the arrival rate is 50 access request/second, the average
interval between two requests is 20 ms, which is shorter than tp ≈ 32.12 ms in
the RLoA-only modes. To minimise tq, the system administrator may consider
the use of multiple authorisation servers when arrival rates goes beyond 30 access
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Figure 6.10: RLoA-only Vs basic-RBAC: the Effect of Queuing Delay
requests/second. This possibility of using multiple authorisation servers needs
further investigation and is considered in our future work.
6.5.7 The DoS Attack Resilience
The RLoA value plays an important role in the RLoA-only mode. If a user’s
RLoA is greater than or equal to the required resource object’s OLoA, CRAAC
will proceed to evaluate the corresponding PA policy. This policy evaluation
introduces additional delays. On the contrary, if RLoA < OLoA, CRAAC will
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stop further processing. That is, it will not evaluate the request against the PA
policy, generating a deny decision no matter what permissions may be assigned
to the access requester. As a result, the AAD will be considerably less than the
one endured when RLoA ≥ OLoA. This experiment is conducted to investigate
the AADs under various RLoA value settings.
The experiment assumes the following:
1. All PA policy sizes are equal across all access requests (i.e. 10 access re-
quests, R1 through R10, made by Bob).
2. The PA policies operate only on permit rules and the algorithm used to
combine these rules is deny-override.
3. The push mode is used to access the resources’ OLoA policy for the 10
access requests.
Furthermore, the experiment assumes the access control decision for R4, R5 and
R8 is deny, because the access requester does not satisfy the LoA requirements of
the corresponding resource objects (i.e. RLoA < OLoA for the required objects
in R4, R5, and R8). On the other hand, the other access requests assume RLoA ≥
OLoA (i.e. grant decision5). Figure 6.11 presents the results of the experiment.
Two different sets of results can be seen from Figure 6.11. The first set
is named as A, which includes R1, R2, R3, R6, R7, R9, and R10. All access
requests in this set have their RLoABob values greater than or equal to the required
resource OLoA value. Set B, on the other hand, contains R4, R5 and R8, for
which RLoABob is less than the OLoA values of the required objects. As can be
seen from the figure, the average AADs of set A is about 212.73 milliseconds and
for set B is about 1.26 milliseconds. This means the average AAD for set B is
5Assuming that evaluating the PA policy produces a grant decision as well.
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Figure 6.11: The RLoA Value Effect on the RLoA-onlypush AAD
about 0.59% of the value for set A. This reveals that the system takes less time
to deny than grant. This is because in this case, the system only needs to access
the resources’ OLoA policy and if the system recognises that RLoA < OLoA, it
rejects the request. Thus, it does not need to evaluate the PA policy saving a
considerable amount of processing time. This result has an interesting security
implication that needs further investigation.
The previous experimental results show that the use of the RLoA-only mode
makes the processing of access requests significantly efficient in case that RLoA <
OLoA. This may indicate that the RLoA-only mode is more resilient to DoS
attacks than the basic-RBAC mode. To investigate this observation further, two
more experiments have been conducted. The first runs the basic-RBAC mode,
while the second runs the RLoA-only mode.
The first experiment assumes Eve has successfully impersonated Bob and
managed to get into the RBAC system. For example, Eve may have worked out
Bob’s password and logged into the system using Bob’s e-ID credential. Eve then
assumes Bob’s role (i.e. Staff ). At this point, Eve can launch a DoS attack on
the system. For example, she may request as many resource objects as possible,
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or may execute a script that sends requests at a rate of, say, 100,000 per second,
to access the same resource object. For each of these requests, the system needs
to check the PA policy before a deny or grant decision is made.
The experimental results show the average AADbasic−RBAC per access request
is about 200.65 milliseconds. Thus, the basic-RBAC mode takes about 5.57 hours
to process the 100,000 access requests. It is worth emphasising that the 5.57
hours is the time it takes for the system to grant/deny an access request made
by Eve. During the 5.57 hour interval, the system is too busy to serve any other
requests, thus a legitimate user may not be able to access the system resources.
In addition, as Eve has successfully impersonated Bob’s identity, Eve will be
able to access the resource objects that are granted to the Staff role. These are
two severe vulnerabilities in the basic-RBAC mode (i.e. the DoS attack and the
impersonation attack).
In the second experiment, when Eve has successfully used Bob’s password
credential to log into the system, similar to the case in the first experiment, Eve
will assume Bob’s role (i.e. Staff ). This is because, in the RLoA-only mode,
CRAAC uses users’ static credentials to assign initial roles. Eve can then launch
the 100,000 access requests. For each of these requests, the RLoA-only mode will
perform a LoA evaluation (i.e. RLoA ≥ OLoA) before checking the actual PA
policy. To succeed in this evaluation, Eve would have to compromise more access
control barriers, such as passing through a location-based authentication service
and/or possessing other stronger authentication credentials. Otherwise, Eve’s
requests will be denied. Denying an access request at this stage takes about 1.26
milliseconds. Thus, the system will take about 2.16 minutes in total to process the
100,000 access requests provided that Eve can not acquire a sufficiently higher6
RLoA value. Therefore, the CRAAC system running the RLoA-only mode can
6in comparison with the requested resource object OLoA
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recover sooner from DoS attacks than the basic-RBAC mode.
6.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has proposed an access control architecture, along with its compo-
nents to realise the vision of the LoA-linked access control (i.e. CRAAC). The
most notable service supported by the architecture is the LoA derivation service
that estimates a requester’s level of assurance based upon the requester’s real-
time contextual information. This level of assurance value is then fed into the
CRAAC authorisation decision engine, thus achieving context-risk-aware access
control. Extensibility, generality, modularity, high level functional encapsulation,
and transparency are among the important requirements for the design of the
CRAAC architecture. To the authors’ best knowledge, the CRAAC architecture
is the first context-aware access control architecture designed for UbiComp envi-
ronments, which has linked a subject’s LoA to the sensitivity level of a requested
resource object.
This chapter has also reported experiments that evaluate the RLoA-only mode
against the RBAC model in terms of AADs. The experimental results reveal that
a large proportion of the average access delay in the RLoA-only mode is actually
caused by accessing and parsing the PA policy as well as the resources’ OLoA
policy. The larger the PA policy, the higher the AADs. The results also show that
the additional functionality of the RLoA-only mode only contributes a relatively
small level of overhead to the average access delay caused by the basic RBAC
functions. Using the push mode to access the resources’ OLoA policy can further
reduce this overhead making it almost negligible. The most interesting security
finding from these experiments is that the RLoA-only mode is more resilient to
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both DoS7 and impersonation attacks than the basic RBAC model.
7In case of denying an access request due to insufficient assurance in a subject trying to gain
access to a resource object
Chapter 7
The AttributeLoA-only Mode
7.1 Chapter Introduction
As the proposed CRAAC architecture, described in Chapter 6, supports the
RLoA-only mode, it should also support the other modes. This chapter de-
scribes the CRAAC architecture along with its components that support the
AttributeLoA-only mode services. In addition, the chapter investigates the per-
formance of the AttributeLoA-only mode. The investigation focuses on two fun-
damental factors: 1) the effect of the PA policy size, and 2)the effect of the
number of contextual attributes a subject has subscribed to.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: -
• Section 7.2 shows the main differences between the AttributeLoA-only and
RLoA-only modes in terms of the architectural components used.
• Section 7.3 shows how the AttributeLoA-only mode uses the CRAAC ar-
chitecture to govern access control using the individual contextual attribute
LoA values.
• Section 7.4 discusses the potentials and concerns of the AttributeLoA-only
130
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mode.
• Section 7.5 investigates the performance of the AttributeLoA-only mode.
• Section 7.6 summarises the chapter.
7.2 CRAACArchitecture and the AttributeLoA-
only Mode
In the AttributeLoA-only mode, access to sensitive resources is governed by the
individual contextual attribute LoA values. There are differences between the
AttributeLoA-only mode and the RLoA-only mode (described in Chapter 6) in
terms of the resources’ OLoA policy and the CRAAC architectural components
used.
When the AttributeLoA-only mode is used, the resources’ OLoA policy writ-
ten for the RLoA-only mode is no longer applicable. In the RLoA-only mode,
each resource object is tagged with a single OLoA value that a subject has to
satisfy to gain access to the resource object. However, in some application sce-
narios, a resource provider may specify a particular LoA requirement for each
contextual attribute. As shown in Figure 5.1, the access requirement for a re-
source object (i.e. Printer) can be specified in terms of the LoA values associated
to one or more individual contextual attributes (e.g. AH, CS, etc). This is the
AttributeLoA-only mode of working.
As seen in Figure 7.1, the main difference, in the architectural components
used, between the AttributeLoA-only and RLoA-only modes are: 1) the use of
the LoA-aware PDPs, 2) the use of PDPAttributeLoA, and 3) the removal of the
LoA Aggregator, PDPRLoA−I , and PDPRLoA−II .
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aggregating the individual attribute LoA values into an RLoA value as in the
RLoA-only mode. Thus, the main function of the LoADI, in the AttributeLoA-
only mode, is to receive the contextual attribute values from the CMI, derives
relevant LoA values, and sends the LoA values back to the LoA-aware PDP Co-
ordinator. The LoA-aware PDP Coordinator will then submit the LoA values
to the corresponding LoA-aware PDP (i.e. PDPCS, PDPAuthN or PDPAH). A
LoA-aware PDP will compare the received LoA value of the subject against that
of the resource object in order to reach a partial access control decision that
will be sent to the LoA-aware PDP Coordinator. The LoA-aware PDP Coor-
dinator aggregates all the partial access control decisions made by the multiple
LoA-aware PDPs into one LoA-aware access control decision. Actually, the set of
LoA-aware PDPs, in this mode, replaces PDPRLoA−II in order to generate access
control decisions based upon the individual attributeLoA values instead of the
RLoA values.
7.3 AttributeLoA-only Mode Data-Flow
The main difference in the work-flow between the AttributeLoA-only mode and
the RLoA-only mode is that the former does not address RLoA aggregation.
Rather, it uses the subordinate LoA-aware PDPs in order to generate partial ac-
cess control decisions based on the LoA values of the contextual attributes used.
For example, to take an access control decision based on the authN contextual
attribute, the PDPauthN evaluates the OLoAauthN required by a resource object
against the LoAauthN of an access requester. The AttributeLoA-only mode pro-
vides a new process to aggregate all subordinate LoA-aware PDPs partial access
control decisions into one final LoA-aware access control decision. This process is
performed by the LoA-aware PDP Coordinator. In fact, this process has not been
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seen in the RLoA-only mode1, since the RLoA-only mode does not take decision
in terms of the individual attribute LoA values. This is depicted in Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Data-flow in the AttributeLoA-only Mode
7.4 Potentials and Concerns
The AttributeLoA-only mode provides new services in comparison with the RLoA-
only mode. Those include:
1. The ability to assign different contextual attribute sets to different services
or resource objects.
This allows a service provider to require a subject to subscribe to a par-
ticular subset of a contextual attribute set and use the corresponding LoA
values to control access to a resource object.
1See Figure 6.3 for more detail
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2. To allow a service provider to specify a certain LoA requirement on a par-
ticular contextual attribute set in order to access its resource objects. In
other words, the contextual attributes may have varying levels of impact
on the overall access control decision. For example, a service provider may
value the location contextual attribute over the channel security attribute
when releasing its resource object(s).
3. The AttributeLoA-only mode maps naturally to the existing context-aware
access control solutions largely discussed in Chapter 3. For example, if only
a location-aware PDP is used, the AttributeLoA-only mode will correspond
to the SRBAC model [39]. This is accomplished of course after the location
information is converted to the corresponding LoA.
Two issues need to be discussed in the AttributeLoA-only mode: context-
dependency and potential communication overhead. Since an access control pol-
icy is, conceptually, expressed in terms of the individual contextual attribute
types and their corresponding LoA values, adding a new or remove an obsolete
contextual attribute requires alteration in the architectural components. For ex-
ample, adding a temporal attribute requires the addition of a new LoA-aware
PDP (i.e. PDPtemporal) as well as modifying the LoA-aware PDP Coordinator to
acknowledge the new PDP. In fact, this drawback is inherited from the traditional
context-aware access control models2. However, the level of context-dependency
in the AttributeLoA-only mode differs from that of the traditional context-aware
access control models. The context-dependency in the former isn’t expected to
hinder extensibility. This is because CRAAC uses a standard interface between
the LoA-aware PDP Coordinator and the set of subordinate LoA-aware PDPs.
Currently, CRAAC uses XACML 2.0 as the standard interface. Thus, adding a
2See Section 3.4 for more detail
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new LoA-aware PDP should only exhibit a minimum modification in the other
architectural components. Also, the AttributeLoA-only mode hides the contex-
tual data representation from the authorisation engine, thus providing a higher
level of encapsulation than that of the CAAC-based solutions.
The communication overhead in the AttributeLoA-only mode is expected to
be generally higher than that of the RLoA-only mode. This is because, in the
former mode of working, for every contextual attribute used by the system, a
separate LoA-aware PDP is required. This is in contrast to the RLoA-only
mode, which requires only a single LoA-linked authorisation decision point (i.e.
PDPRLoA−II). Thus, the more attributes used, the more PDPs are required,
hence the higher the communication overhead. The level of overhead versus the
number of LoA-aware PDPs will be experimentally assessed.
One may argue that the overall policy complexity of the model may be signif-
icant on the model performance. If CRAAC policy is compared against that of
the CAAC-based model, CRAAC policy is simpler and readable. Only one (i.e.
in RLoA-only mode) constraint is expressed in the policy. In addition, CRAAC
can easily use any policy language without a significant modification as the LoA
constraint is a simple data type (i.e. double) that most policy languages support.
This is a major contrast to the existing CRAAC-based solutions.
7.5 AttributeLoA-onlyMode Performance Eval-
uation
This section reports the experimental investigations of the AttributeLoA-only
mode performance. The main objective of the experiments is to answer the
question: What is the additional cost (i.e. in terms of AADs) a subject has
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to endure in the AttributeLoA-only mode in comparison with the RLoA-only
mode? Two factors are expected to affect the performance of the AttributeLoA-
only mode: the PA policy size and the number of contextual attributes used (i.e.
the number of LoA-aware PDPs required).
7.5.1 The Effect of the PA Policy Size
This experiment investigates the effect of the PA policy size on the AADs in the
AttributeLoA-only mode and compares the results against those from the RLoA-
only mode. The following configurations have been used in this experiment:
1. The push mode is used to access the resources’ OLoA policy.
As the focus of this experiment is to investigate the effect of the PA policy
size on AADs, the use of the push mode eliminates the effect of the resources’
OLoA policy size.
2. In the experiment, a subject, Bob, with one enabled role, Staff, makes six
access requests to six different resource objects. The six access requests are
denoted as R1 through R6 with PA policy sizes of 3.8, 35.6, 206.3, 306.0,
407.7, and 511.8 KBytes, respectively.
3. Only permit rules are used in policies and the algorithm used to combine the
rules is deny-override. The implication of this assumption is that every rule
contained in the PA policy will be evaluated before making a decision. The
experiment also assumes Bob’s contextual attributes LoA values are always
greater than the required LoA values of the requested resource object across
the six access requests. This assumption ensures the execution of CRAAC
always reaches the stage where the PA policy files are opened and all policy
rules contained in the files are evaluated. In this way, the experiment can
investigate the precise effects of various PA policy sizes on the AADs.
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Figure 7.3 shows two sets of AADs measured in milliseconds against the six
different access requests. One set is from the RLoA-only mode and the other is
from the AttributeLoA-only mode. The following observation can be made from
the figure.
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Figure 7.3: AttributeLoA-only Vs RLoA-only: the Effect of the PA Policy Size
In both AttributeLoA-only and RLoA-only modes, the AADs increase steadily
as the PA policy size increases. The differences between the two sets of AADs
are negligible (i.e. about 0.48% averaged across the six access requests). This
result demonstrates that the major AAD contributions are from the compo-
nents or services that are common in both modes of working. The additional
services/components used in the AttributeLoA-only mode contribute fraction-
ally to the overall AADs. In fact, the amount of overheads contributed by the
AttributeLoA-only mode is consistent and almost the same across different PA
policy sizes. The overhead appears to be independent of the PA policy size. This
observation reveals that the AttributeLoA-only mode performance is almost the
same as that of the RLoA-only mode; this was not anticipated. After an investi-
gation we have found that the reason for this is the use of push mode in retrieving
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the PA policies. Pushing the resources’ OLoA policy in this mode makes all the
LoA-aware PDPs operate on memory not on disk. In other words, a LoA-aware
PDP needs just a memory search to get the required resource object’s LoA re-
quirement (i.e. OLoA) in order to generate a partial LoA-aware access control
decision. However, if the LoA-aware PDP uses the pull mode to access a re-
sources’ OLoA policy file, the additional overhead incurred by pulling the policy
may be significant. To verify this hypothesis, an experiment has been performed,
in which the LoA-aware PDPs pull the corresponding policy. In this experiment,
the average AAD across the 6 access requests increases by about 23% than that
of the RLoA-only mode. This increase is significant and complies with our ex-
pectation. As a conclusion, the pull mode is not recommended to be used when
the CRAAC model is configured in the AttributeLoA-only mode.
7.5.2 The Effect of the Number of Contextual Attributes
The main objective of this experiment is to investigate the effect of the num-
ber of contextual attributes, a subject has subscribed to, on the AADs in the
AttributeLoA-only mode. The experiment evaluates the effects of 6 contextual
attribute set sizes (i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32) on the AADs in the AttributeLoA-
only mode. This, in fact, evaluates the effect of the number of LoA-aware PDPs
on the overall AADs in the AttributeLoA-only mode. The experiment uses the
following configuration:
1. The same resource object is accessed by the same access requester (i.e. Bob)
in the 6 cases of contextual attribute sizes. Thus, the effect of the PA policy
size on the AADs should be the same across the 6 cases. In addition, Bob’s
contextual attributes LoA values are always greater than the required LoA
values of the requested resource object across the six access requests.
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2. Only permit rules are used in the PA policies and the algorithm used to
combine the rules is deny-override. The implication of this assumption
is that every rule contained in the PA policy file will be evaluated before
making an access control decision.
3. The resources’ OLoA policy is accessed using the push mode.
4. All contextual attributes in Bob’s contextual attributes set are of the same
cardinality and rank value. This ensures the effect of the ROCs (i.e. used
for L2WC) is almost the same, thus eliminating the effect of the types of
the contextual attributes used and focuses only on their number.
Figure 7.4 shows the results of the experiment. It shows a set of AADs
measured in milliseconds against 6 different contextual attribute set sizes. It
can be seen from the figure that the more contextual attributes used, the longer
the delay an access requester would have to endure. For example, when the
contextual attribute set size is 1, the AAD is about 21.81 milliseconds and when
it is 2, the AAD is about 22.50 milliseconds. This is about 3.13% increase in
AAD, which may not be significant. However, when the size increases from 1 to
8, the increase in AAD is about 11.66%, and when the size increases from 1 to
32 the AAD increase is about 37%. This should not be considered negligible.
7.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has shown the CRAAC architecture in the AttributeLoA-only mode.
The differences between the architectural components used in the RLoA-only
mode and those used in the AttributeLoA-only mode are: 1) the use of the
LoA-aware PDPs, 2) the use of PDPAttributeLoA, and 3) the removal of the LoA
Aggregator, PDPRLoA−I , and PDPRLoA−II . The most notable potential of the
CHAPTER 7. THE ATTRIBUTELOA-ONLY MODE 141
1 2 4 8 16 32
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
21.81
22.49
22.66
24.36
26.67
29.90
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
c
c
e
s
s
 D
e
la
y
 (
m
il
li
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
AttributeLoA-only mode (push)
The Number of Contextual Attributes
1 2 4 8 16 32
AttributeLoA-onlypush 21.81 22.50 22.66 24.36 26.67 29.90
Figure 7.4: AttributeLoA-only: the Effect of the Contextual Attribute Set Size
AttributeLoA-only mode is that it maps naturally to the existing context-aware
access control solutions discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter has also reported
experiments that evaluate the AttributeLoA-only mode in terms of AADs.
The experimental results reveals that the AttributeLoA-only mode perfor-
mance is comparable to the RLoA-only mode using the push policy retrieval
mode. When the pull mode is used, the additional overhead considerably shoots
high. Thus, the pull mode is not recommended when CRAAC is configured in
the AttributeLoA-only mode. The number of contextual attributes a subject
has subscribed to is another important factor that affect the AttributeLoA-only
mode AADs. The experimental investigation shows that the more contextual
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis addressed challenges in access control for UbiComp environments.
These challenges include:
• How to capture an access requester’s dynamic contextual information and
feed it into the authorisation decision engine seamlessly at run-time.
• How to accommodate new contextual attributes without imposing consid-
erable modifications on the underlying access control service.
• How to support fine-grained access control of resource objects with varying
sensitivity levels in a context-aware environment such as UbiComp.
• How to deal with contextual information that is expressed using different
representation models.
• How to minimise the effect of compromising the access control policy store.
8.1 Conclusion
The Context-Risk-Aware Access Control model (CRAAC) for UbiComp environ-
ments is the novel contribution of this thesis. CRAAC is a LoA-linked access
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control model that controls access to resources with varying levels of sensitivity
based, indirectly, upon an access requester’s contextual information. The con-
textual information is used to compute the access requester’s LoA value that is
used as the only constraint to control access to the protected resources. CRAAC
supports fined-grained access control, since it, virtually, accommodates any set
of contextual attributes. CRAAC provides flexibility in adding new contextual
attributes or removing obsolete ones. This flexibility will not considerably affect
the underlying access control system. In other words, the level of modification
in the underlying access control system is not significant. CRAAC supports four
modes of working to accommodate different access control requirements. The
derivation of an access requester’s aggregate LoA value (i.e. RLoA) is controlled
by the relationships amongst the access requester’s set of contextual attributes
(i.e. Elevating or Weakest-Link).
The CRAAC safety is expected to be higher than that of the RBAC model,
since CRAAC utilises additional constraints (i.e. LoA constraints). It is also
evident that CRAAC is more resilient to DoS attacks than the traditional RBAC
model in denying access to a resource object when the attacker can not acquire a
sufficiently high RLoA value. The thesis has reported experiments that evaluate
the RLoA-only, basic-RBAC, and AttributeLoA-only modes in terms of AADs.
The experimental results reveal that a large proportion of the average access
delay in the RLoA-only mode is actually caused by accessing and parsing the PA
policy as well as the resources’ OLoA policy. And so for the AttributeLoA-only
mode. The larger the PA policy file, the higher the AADs. The results also
shows that the additional functionality of the RLoA-only mode only contributes
a small level of overhead to the average access delay caused by the basic RBAC
functions. Using the push mode to access the resources’ OLoA policy can further
reduce the overhead making it almost negligible. Moreover, the experimental
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results show that the AttributeLoA-only mode performance is comparable to the
RLoA-only mode using the push policy retrieval mode. When the pull mode is
used, the additional overhead is considerably high. Thus, the pull mode is not
recommended when CRAAC is configured in the AttributeLoA-only mode.
The following lists the novel contributions of the research presented in this
thesis: -
1. The proposal of the CRAAC model.
CRAAC is an adaptive LoA-linked access control model. It controls access
to resources with varying levels of sensitivity based upon the state of an
access requester’s contextual information. It supports adaptive access con-
trol decisions, since an access control decision for the same access requester
on the same resource object may vary each time. The variation depends
on the level of assurance of the access requester, which is based upon the
access requester’s current contextual information.
• CRAAC supports fined-grained access control, since it, virtually, ac-
commodates any set of contextual attributes. This level of abstraction
is achieved by the use of a trust-related parameter (i.e. Requester’s
Level of Assurance (RLoA)). In addition, in controlling access to a re-
source object, CRAAC accommodates the resource object’s sensitivity
level in order to provide a more fine-grained access control.
• CRAAC is flexible; adding new contextual attributes or removing ob-
solete ones will not significantly affect the underlying access control
system.
• CRAAC supports four modes of working to accommodate different
access control requirements.
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 145
2. LoA calculations
• The identification of the contextual attributes that may have an impact
on a subject’s LoA.
• The LoA quantification of the corresponding contextual attributes.
This is performed mimicking the NIST LoAeToekn work in order to
convert the contextual attribute values into LoA ranks.
• Surveying the possible LoA to weight conversion methods and adopting
ROC for the conversion (i.e. L2WC).
• Proposing two methods for the RLoA aggregation (i.e. Weakest-Link
and the Elevating).
3. An access control architecture along with its components to support the
novel CRAAC services. The architecture supports the four modes of work-
ing.
4. CRAAC Evaluation
• Prototype-based performance evaluation of the CRAAC model.
• Investigating the safety of the CRAAC model in terms of the con-
straints used.
• Investigating the denial of service and impersonation attacks.
8.2 Future Work
Through research, we have identified the following issues that require further
investigation:
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• How to quantify and derive the assurance level of an access requester’s
authorisation and authentication history. In other words, how could we
quantitatively assess the authorisation and authentication transactions of
an access requester for a past period? Currently, CRAAC assumes this is
done at the corresponding access history logical sensor.
• CRAAC management in a distributed setting.
The CRAAC architecture has been evaluated in a centralised setting by
which all the CRAAC architectural components are placed in one site (i.e.
one PC). The performance of the CRAAC model when its architecture is
distributed should be evaluated. This also may encompass the possibility
of using multiple authorisation servers. The proposed architecture of the
CRAAC model may not be readily adopted in a distributed setting, thus
may add more overhead/complexity. In addition, using a distributed setting
may impose more security vulnerabilities and loopholes an attacker could
utilise. For example, how to trust a piece of contextual information that
is provided by a remote context provider located in another domain? Such
a concern needs to be investigated before using CRAAC in a distributed
setting.
• Policy Languages.
For interoperability with the well-known existing authorisation solutions,
there is a need to implement more standard PDP interfaces (e.g. PERMIS).
• Generic Authorisation Architecture
Can CRAAC fit in any application domain even those non context-aware?
The possibility of the current CRAAC architecture to be adapted, to cope
with diversified access control requirements, needs to be assessed. For exam-
ple, can CRAAC be used to address the GRID access control requir
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What are the level of modifications in the current CRAAC architecture re-
quired for this? In other words, how to extend the CRAAC functionality
without compromising its features. For example, a basic requirement is to
have an obligation service. The obligation service is required to perform
temporal obligations (i.e. before, with, and after). A generic implementa-
tion of the obligation service is challenging as obligations are application-
dependant.
• XACML LoA-aware profile. This is a challenging task as creating an
XACML profile for LoA-aware access control policies not only requires a
modification in the current XACML standard but also providing a code
library that evaluates such policies.
• How to calculate the trust level of both the contextual providers and their
provided contextual information. In other words, the contextual data man-
agement will not be assumed as a part of the TCB.
• Investigating more vulnerability that may CRAAC may have. This may
include convert channel attacks, distributed DoS attack, etc.
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